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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF XBRL AND SOCIAL MEDIA ON INFORMATION ASYMMETRY:
EVIDENCE FROM BANK LOAN CONTRACTS
Dazhi Chong
Old Dominion University, 2016
Director: Dr. Harris Wu

This study analyzes how two information technology advancements, the adoption of
XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), and social media, affect bank loan
contracting using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts in 2011. I hypothesize that the
adoption of XBRL and social media can enhance information dissemination and mitigate the
information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders. Consistent with this
hypothesize, I find that borrowers that adopt XBRL and/or receive positive social media user
opinion in social media enjoy more favorable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts.
Additional analyses indicate that the relations among XBRL adoption, social media user opinion
and bank loan price vary with the firm size, loan structure and availability of public information
of borrowers. Overall, this research provides evidence that technology advancements, the
adoption of XRBL and social media, reduce cost of bank loans by decreasing information
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1

BACKGROUND
Recent development in information technology, especially XBRL (eXtensible Business

Reporting Language) and social media, has changed the way that firms communicate with
stakeholders. As a standard for exchanging business information, XBRL enables the tagging of
information using predefined taxonomy. This feature makes it easier for analysts, investors, and
other stakeholders to access, analyze, and process financial information. Realizing the advantage
of XBRL, on January 30, 2009, SEC (Securities Exchange Commission) adopted rules that
require companies to submit their financial statements in XBRL format. After June 15, 2011, the
proposed rules apply to domestic and foreign companies using U.S. GAAP and to foreign private
issuers using International Financial Reporting(Securities Exchange Commission, 2009).
Another new technology, social media, also shows its potential to facilitate information
dissemination. Social media allows firms to push information to investors or customers
simultaneously via postings, direct message et.al. This characteristic reduces the time and cost
that investors or customers spend in sorting through various news sources(Blankespoor, Miller,
& White, 2013). More importantly, social media communications are bi-directional which
enable direct and immediate interactions among users(He, Zha, & Li, 2013). While some
researchers have found that XBRL and social media can bypass the shortcomings of traditional
information dissemination tools and reduce information inequities in the capital markets (Bollen,
Mao, & Zeng, 2011; Farewell, 2006; Maina, 2015), few studies have been conducted on the
relationship between these new technologies and loan contracts. This dissertation extends the
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literature by examining how the adoption of XBRL, and social media sentiment, affect bank loan
contracts.
1.2

RESEARCH QUESTION
The importance of bank loans attracts lots of researchers to investigate the determinants

of bank loan contracting(Bae & Goyal, 2009; Benmelech, Garmaise, & Moskowitz, 2004;
Bharath, Sunder, & Sunder, 2008; Dennis, Nandy, & Sharpe, 2000; Diamond, 1991b; Hasan,
Park, & Wu, 2012; Haselmann, Pistor, & Vig, 2010; Klock, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2005; Lin, Chen,
& Yen, 2014; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Strahan, 1999; Sufi, 2007; Wu, Francis, Hasan, & Koetter,
2011). Some firm characteristics and loan characteristics such as default risk, liquidation value,
and corporate board structure are found to be associated with loan contracts. However, there is a
lack of current research on how the adoption of XBRL affects bank loan contracts. As XBRL has
the potential to reduce information asymmetry in the capital markets, there is a possible link
between XBRL adoption and loan contracts. Therefore, the first purpose of this study is to
investigate the effect of XBRL on information asymmetry in capital markets, in particular, to
evaluate the impact of XBRL adoption on the price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts.
Hence, the first two research questions that need to be answered are:
1. Can the adoption of XBRL affect price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts?
2. How does the adoption of XBRL affect price and non-price terms of bank loan
contracts?
Many studies have found that social media sentiment is an important indicator of firm's
potential risks and values. For instance, Hu, Liu, and Zhang (2008) find that online product
reviews are major information source for consumers to make buying decision. There is a positive
relationship between favorable peer reviews and product sales. By analyzing the peer opinions
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on social media, Chen, De, Hu, and Hwang (2014) find that social media sentiment has
predictive power over future stock returns and earnings surprises. Although prior studies suggest
that social media sentiment is associated with firm's stock returns and sales, there is a lack of
empirical evidence of the relationship between social media sentiment and loan contracts.
Therefore, the second purpose of this study is to investigate how social media sentiment affects
loan contracts. This objective leads to the other two research questions of this study:
1. Can social media sentiment affect price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts?
2. How does social media sentiment affect price and non-price terms of bank loan
contracts?
1.3

THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE DISSERTATION
This dissertation contributes to the literature in the following aspects. First, this

dissertation is the first to examine the impact of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment on
the cost of bank loan. Using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts in 2011, this study finds
that borrowers that adopt XBRL and/or receive positive social media user opinion enjoy more
favorable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. Second, this dissertation reveals that
the effect of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment on bank loan price is not homogenous.
The analyses show that these effects are stronger for small borrowers and syndicated loans.
Furthermore, the analyses also find that borrowers that adopt XBRL are more likely to be offered
with unsecured loan.
In sum, this study confirms the hypotheses that both the adoption of XBRL and social
media sentiment are important indicators of borrower's risks and values. The study not only
answers the question "Can XBRL and social media affect price and non-price terms of bank
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loan?", but also provides stakeholders with a better guide for how to use XBRL and social media
to decrease information asymmetry in the capital markets.
1.4

OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION
The remainder of the dissertation is structured as follows: chapter 2 provides a brief

review of the literature concerned with the determinants of bank loan contracts and develops the
hypotheses of this study. This chapter contains four sections: Section 2.1 introduces prior
findings related to the determinants of bank loan contracts. Section 2.2 discusses the framework
and benefits of XBRL. Section 2.3 introduces the framework and benefits of social media. The
final section, section 2.4 discusses knowledge gap in the literature and develops the hypotheses
of this study.
The purpose of chapter 3 is to present the research methodology and the research
approaches adopted by this study. This chapter contains five sections. First, section 3.1 describes
the architecture of the Bank Loan Pricing Analytics System (BLPAS). Three key modules of
BLPAS: data collection module, data integration module and data analysis module are
introduced in this section. The second section, section 3.2 presents the data sources of this study.
After introducing sampling procedure in section 3.3, section 3.4 describes the measurement of
dependent variables, independent variables, and control variables in this study. Finally, the
empirical models for the study are discussed in section 3.5.
By presenting results of the regression analyses, chapter 4 provides evidences to indicate
how XBRL and social media sentiment affect bank loan price. This chapter contains five
sections: Section 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlation analysis of dependent and
independent variables. Section 4.2 and 4.3 presents the results of the regression analysis related
to XBRL, social media sentiment and loan price. After discussing the results of robust test in
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section 4.4, section 4.5 introduces the results of analysis on firm size. Section 4.6 analyzes the
results of analysis on lending relationship. Section 4.7 reports the results of analysis on
syndication. Finally, the results of analysis on Non-Price terms are discussed in section4.8.
The last chapter, chapter 5 presents the research conclusion of this research. This chapter
contains three sections. Section 5.1 discusses implications for the research. Section 5.3
introduces future research opportunities. And section 5.4 includes a summary with conclusions.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
2.1

DETERMINANTS OF BANK LOAN PRICING
In the bank loan literature, the determinants of bank loan contracting have attracted

tremendous research interests. For instance, Zhang (2008) examines the benefits of accounting
conservatism in the loan contracting process. He finds that accounting conservatism results in
reduced default risk, which enables lenders to offer lower initial interest rates to borrowers.
Bharath et al. (2008) focus on the relationship between borrower accounting quality and loan
prices. They suggest that lenders have to raise interest rates and tighten non-price debt terms to
compensate for the default risk arising from low accounting quality. Hasan et al. (2012) examine
the impact of earnings predictability on both price and non-price terms. They find that lower
predictable earnings are associated with higher interest rates, shorter maturities, and more
covenants and collateral requirements. Benmelech et al. (2004) argue that higher liquidation
value can not only lower the cost of liquidation but also increase the asset’s durability and make
longer maturity debt feasible. Thus, borrowers with high liquidation value are more likely to
receive favorite loans prices and no-price terms. Sufi (2007) finds that high borrower reputation
is associated with low default risk, which enables banks to offer favorite loan terms to borrowers.
Some studies find that corporate board structure also affects bank loan price. As an important
corporate governance mechanisms to control loan risk, independent board makes firms easier to
control CEO overcompensation(Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999) , limit overinvestments(Richardson, 2006) and reduce earnings management and financial fraud(Agrawal &
Chadha, 2005; Klein, 2002). From this point, the less independent a borrower's board is, the
more likely it will experience financial distress and be offered high loan price(Daily & Dalton,
1994; Lee & Yeh, 2004).
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In addition to firm characteristics, some external factors are also associated with debt
contracting. Qian and Strahan (2007) study the impact factor of bank loan price from law and
finance view. They argue that loan contracts are the reflection of differences in legal protection
of lenders and the enforcement of contracts. When lenders' rights are well protected, the law
enforces lenders' ability to the take collateral in the case of default. In this situation, borrowers
are more likely to get favorable loan terms. Consistent with Qian's findings, Bae and Goyal
(2009) find that firms in a region with strong creditor rights and high enforceability of loan
contracts are more likely to receive lower loan spreads, longer maturities.
Besides the impact factors mentioned above, theoretical work suggests that information
asymmetry is another key determinant of loan contracting. Information asymmetry is a situation
where at least one party in a contract relationship has more information than others. The
occurrence of asymmetric information creates an unbalanced transaction and result in "moral
hazard" and "adverse selection" problems in the loan contracting(Kim, 1985). When the levels of
information asymmetry are different, loan terms offered by lenders will also be different
(Amihud & Mendelson, 1986; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; Easley & O'hara, 2004). According
to the literature, information asymmetry is mainly caused by specific firm characteristics and
loan characteristics. For instance, Barclay and Smith (1995) examine the relationship between
firm size and information asymmetry. Their findings suggest that large firms are more efficient
in reducing information asymmetries. As a result, large firms are more likely to get long-term
debt. Bhojraj and Sengupta (2003) argue that the agency risk and information risk between
management and outside stakeholders will affect bank loan price. In general, these research
imply that when information asymmetry is high between borrowers and banks, banks are more
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likely to raise interest rates and tighten non-price debt terms to compensate for default risk and
potential losses(Wu et al., 2011).
In order to reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outside investors or
stakeholders, firms often use disclosure to disseminate private information to the markets. As a
popular tool, disclosure has been shown to influence a number of operations related factors such
as firm’s cost of capital (Botosan1997), analyst following (Lang and Lundholm 1996),
institutional investor following (Bushee and Noe 2000), and stock price volume and volatility
(Healy, Hutton, and Palepu 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000). The main drawbacks of disclosure are
that it can only reach limited set of stakeholders and are often biased(Blankespoor et al., 2013;
Miller & Skinner, 2015). For instance, business press is an important disclosure approach. Many
investors rely on business press to acquire value relevant information. Bushee, Core, Guay, and
Hamm (2010) find that greater press coverage around earnings announcements reduces
information asymmetry in the form of spread reductions and depth improvements. Soltes (2010)
finds that disclosure dissemination through the press reduces spreads, increases trading volume,
and lowers idiosyncratic volatility. Kothari, Li, and Short (2009) find that positive (negative)
press coverage decreases (increases) firms’ cost of capital, return volatility, and analyst forecast
dispersion. However, some studies find that only important corporate news releases are
sufficiently monitored by traders, increased distribution of the information by the press only
results in little increase in dissemination(Bushee et al., 2010). Further, much of the information
disseminated to the market by the press doesn't contain editorial content, and only provides
limited information (Soltes, 2010).
Beside business press, another main disclosure approach, conference call also has some
shortcomings. Mayew (2008) argues that managers are more likely to call on analysts who have
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more favorable recommendations. Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller (2003) find that firms with
relatively more shareholders and relatively fewer institutional holders are more likely to open
their conference calls. Their finding suggests that the scope of information dissemination is
determined by the nature of the firm’s investor base.
2.2

EXTENSIBLE BUSINESS REPORTING LANGUAGE (XBRL)
While the shortcomings of traditional disclosure approaches often limit the depth and

breadth of information dissemination, recent changes in technology make it possible for
investors, analysts, and banks to bypass the weaknesses of traditional tools. Among these
technologies, XBRL is one of the most popular tools used in today's capital markets.
2.2.1 INTRODUCTION
XBRL(eXtensible Business Reporting Language) is a XML based reporting language for
exchanging business information(Zhu & Wu, 2014). XBRL enables the tagging of information
using predefined taxonomy. Therefore, XBRL tags can be easily accessed and interpreted by
computer applications. Currently, XBRL has been widely used by banking regulators, stock
exchanges regulators, investors, analysts, and statistical agencies.
XBRL is composed of three key components: specification, taxonomy, and instance
documents. As a guideline of taxonomies and instance documents design, specification defines
how to build XBRL instance documents and XBRL taxonomies. The standardization of syntax
of instance documents, syntax of taxonomies, semantics of instance documents, and semantics of
taxonomies enable different users to create, exchange financial data among various
organizations(Wu & Vasarhelyi, 2004). Table 1 shows an example of XBRL specification.
[Insert Table 1 here]
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The second component, taxonomy, contains the definitions of reporting data elements,
reference to the shared meaning of elements, and business rules for validation and interrelation
between data elements. The aim of taxonomy is to classify and standardize the accounting
information generated by different types of accounting standards. Similar to the data dictionary,
data elements and their interrelationships are well defined in taxonomy. As an extensible
framework, XBRL taxonomy allows users to add data elements, redefine relationships and
references. This feature enables companies to create, publish and transfer financial information
without losing the integrity of the data(Aad & Paul, 2008). In XBRL, taxonomy is comprised of
two major components: XML Schemas and linkbases. Taxonomy schemas define the names and
types of concepts. Table 2 shows the examples of taxonomy schemas of US GAAP 2016.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Another component, linkbases, defines the relationships between data elements and
resources related to them. The XBRL 2.1 specification defines five types of linkbases: Definition
Linkbase, Calculation Linkbase, Presentation Linkbase, Reference Linkbase and Label Linkbase.
The first three linkbases describe inter-concept relationships, and the last two linkbases define
the relationships between concept and documentation(Engel et al., 2008).
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 shows how the IncomeTaxesPaidRefund is calculated using two elements:
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsInvestingActivities and
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsOperatingActivities. While the Calculation Linkbase has
described the relations and weights of these elements, it is easy for the users to calculate the
value of IncomeTaxesPaidRefund using the formula below:
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IncomeTaxesPaidRefund = IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsInvestingActivities +
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsOperatingActivities
The third component of XBRL, instance documents, is composed of instances of specific
elements and tags defined in the taxonomies. Instance documents can be used to store and
publish different kind of business reporting information including business facts, units, contexts,
and footnotes(Nutz & Strauß, 2002). Table 4 shows an example of XBRL instance documents.
[Insert Table 4 here]
2.2.2 BENEFITS OF XBRL
Prior studies find that XBRL can facilitate the information sharing among various
stakeholders (Debreceny et al., 2005; Khan, 2006; Pinsker & Li, 2008). For instance, traditional
financial reports are often generated in different formats and various accounting standards. Only
end users are familiar with each accounting standards and data formats. The exchange and
analysis of the information in financial reports are extremely complicated. With the adoption of
XBRL, accounting principles and financial reports can be mapped into standardized data
elements, relationships, and references. As accounting information is more reliable and relevant
in XBRL format, firms can easily adapt to various accounting principles and financial reports
using corresponding XBRL rules(Cuneo, 2003). The comparison of accounting information is
much easier than before(Vasarhelyi, Chan, & Krahel, 2010; Zhu & Wu, 2010).
XBRL can increase the efficiencies of the data integration and processing. The
introduction of XBRL tags allows computers to process information independently, thus
reducing the cost associated with data integration and processing(Altova, 2016; Rezaee & Turner,
2002). The increased efficiencies in the financial data processing also make it possible for
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auditors, regulators and banks to monitor firm's operations continuously(Rezaee & Turner, 2002),
which can significantly reduce the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders.
2.2.3 PRELIMINARY STUDY OF XBRL: FIRM CLUSTERING
2.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
There are several ways to group firms. The most common method is to group them into
different industries according to firm’s core business. In the U.S., the Standard Industry
Classification (SIC) codes, and more recently the North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) codes, have been widely used to classify a firm into a certain industry. These
classification codes provide an efficient way for investors and policy-makers to analyze
economic data and reveal the structure of economy(US Census Bureau, 2012). However, the
code assignments are somewhat static, not capturing the evolvement of firm’s business and
industry structure. For example, as firms expand or shift their business fields, the codes assigned
to firms often do not accurately reflect the “natural” grouping of firms. Thus, more "dynamic"
and "efficient" classification approaches are required in today's highly competitive market.
When financial statements were not digitized or were in unstructured format, it was
difficult to derive useful information from them. This has been fundamentally changed since the
recent adoption of XBRL (XBRL International, 2006). In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange
Commission has adopted the GAAP taxonomy as a data standard. Specified in XBRL, this
taxonomy defines a set of financial reporting concepts and their relationships. Earlier
studies(Zhu & Wu, 2011a; Zhu & Wu, 2011b) show that 87% of the reported data are defined in
the GAAP taxonomy. The wide use of GAAP taxonomy and XBRL makes it possible for me to
mine a large quality of financial statements to identify firm clusters.
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In this study, I model firms and the GAAP Taxonomy elements used by the firms as a
bipartite "social network". I implement a spectral clustering method and apply it to the "social
network". The results demonstrate the feasibility of using financial data to identify firm clusters.
2.2.3.2 RESEARCH METHOD
In order to group firms based on tags used in their financial statements, I develop a Firm
Clustering System to collect data, analyze the structure of the financial statements, and create
clusters. Figure 1 shows the framework of this system.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
Data Collection
I collect the 10-K annual financial statements from 2009 to 2011. If a firm has more than
one 10-K, I choose to use the earliest one. Since there is no reliable method to match custom data
elements, my analysis focuses on the elements of GAAP Taxonomy. In the rest of the paper, I
use the term tag and GAAP element interchangeably. The dataset has 10-K’s of 1799 firms,
which together use 7021 GAAP elements.
In the financial statement, some commonly used tags such as "Assets", "CostofRevenue"
are used by most companies. The strong relationship created by these commonly used tags will
make most companies belong to the same cluster. Since my main objective is to cluster
companies based on their usage of specific tags, it is necessary to ignore these commonly used
tags. Therefore, I delete tags that are used by more than 50 companies. After removing these tags,
5815 elements are used by this research in the final dataset.
Clustering Approach
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Clustering is an efficient way to explore information within certain networks or groups.
Many clustering algorithms are based on the assumption that the data within the dataset that has
specific attributes or links (Zha, He, Ding, Simon, & Gu, 2001). In this study, one company uses
a number of tags specified in the GAAP Taxonomy. Likewise, each tag is also used by several
companies. By treating tags as attributes of companies, the company-tag relationship can be
represented as an m-by-n matrix A. In this case, I can identify clusters based on the relationship
between firms and tags. Figure 2 shows how the clustering works.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
There are numerous algorithms, such as agglomerative clustering (Voorhees, 1986) and
k-means algorithm (Dhillon & Modha, 2001), which can be used to identify clusters. However,
most of them can't guarantee global optimization of clusters (Shi & Malik, 2000). Spectral
clustering is a solution to address this deficiency. The objective of spectral clustering is to find
the partition of a graph so that the linkages between groups are minimized and the linkages
within groups are maximized. In graph language, the linkages among groups are called "cuts",
which can be computed through the total weight of the edges between connected groups. Shi and
Malik (2000) suggest a co-clustering algorithm to minimize cuts globally. They argue that
second smallest eigenvalue of Laplacian matrix can be used to find the minimum cut vertex
partitions in a graph. Dhillon (2001) extends this algorithm. By using the singular value
decomposition (SVD) approach, he finds that the second left and right singular vectors of a
normalized matrix provide an optimal solution for co-clustering problem. While Dhillon's
approach is more efficient and can cluster tags and companies simultaneously, I choose to use
this approach to identify clusters in the dataset. The main procedures of Dhillon's approach are as
follows:
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1. A graph G=(V, E) is a set of vertices V={v1, ,..., vn}, and a set of edges (i, j). Eij is
equal to the edge weight between vi and vj. W is a symmetrical matrix, where Wij =Eij, if there is
an edge between i and j, else Wij =0 ; Let matrix D be an diagonal matrix, where D1(i,j)=  j Wij ,
D2(i,j)= i Wij

 D1
D= 
0

0
D2 

2. Form matrix Wn=D1-1/2WD2-1/2,
3. Compute the second singular vectors of Wn and form the vector z2, where u2 and v2 are
the left and right singular vectors of Wn.

z2=

D1−1/2 u2
D2−1/2 v2

4. Run the k-means algorithm on z2 to obtain the desired clusters.
In this study, there are 1799 firms and 5815 tags, so there are 1799 elements in V and
5815 elements in E, an edge <fi,tj> exists when firm fi uses tj tag. For simplicity, I set the weight
of each edge as one and the edges are undirected. Table 5 shows an example of firm-tag matrix.
For instance, the value of row 2 and column 2 is zero, which indicates that firm1 does not use
tag1 in its financial statement.
[Insert Table 5 here]
My clustering algorithm uses k-means algorithm on the singular vectors to obtain the
desired clusters, thus I need to determine the best value for k. A number of approaches have been
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developed to determine k value. In this study, I use approach suggest by Schaeffer (2007). He
considers three measurements to evaluate the fitness of the k value. Among these measurements,
relative criterion is used to measure the goodness of inter-cluster density. Local criterion focuses
on the goodness of a clustering structure without external information. In order to optimize both
local density and global density, Schaeffer (2007) uses the product of the local and relative
densities to measure the fitness of cluster function. This approach provides an easy way to
optimize k value in this study.
2.2.3.3 FINDINGS
Using the approach mentioned above, I cluster the 1799 companies into 20 clusters.
Based on Schaffer’s approach, I calculate local density, relative density and total density of
different cluster numbers. Table 6 shows the distribution of local density, relative density and
total density in different numbers of clusters.
[Insert Table 6 here]
In table 6, when k is equal to 20, the total density gets the highest value. Since total
density is the tradeoff between local density and relative density, I set the k value as 20. Table 7
shows firm distribution among industry groups according to NAICS.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Next, I try to reveal potential relationship among firms and compare it with standard
classification code. Figure 3 shows the distribution of major industry in 20 clusters.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
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According to figure 3, cluster 17 only contains one firm, Verde Resources Inc (VRI), an
exploration stage company. After removing popular tags, it only has seven tags. In addition to
this outlier case, cluster 5 is also "pure", containing only "Finance and Insurance" (NAICS code
52) firms. Clusters 8, 14, and 15 are nearly pure with predominantly Finance and Insurance firms.
An examination of the firms in these clusters shows that firms within each cluster have
significant similarities in their core businesses. For example, firms in cluster 5 are primarily
insurance companies, whereas firms in cluster 8 are primarily commercial banks. Utilities (code
22) firms are dominant in clusters 1 and 7. Similarly, Mining, Quarrying, Oil, Gas Extraction
(code 21) firms are dominant in cluster 11.
This case study leads me to hypothesize that certain firm behaviors (such as operation
mode, investment strategy) determine the contents and structures of firm financial statements.
Conversely, the contests and structures should help us infer firm characteristics. To preliminarily
test my hypothesis, I analyze the tags used by firms within each cluster. I rank the tags according
to the number of firms that use them. The frequently used tags may indicate major financial
behaviors in these clusters. Table 8 lists the top 10 tags in selected clusters (the list does not
include the removed elements – those used by more than 50 firms).
[Insert Table 8 here]
The tags in cluster 1 indicate that firms are regulated public utilities, some of which are
jointly owned (JointlyOwnedUtilityPlantProportionateOwnershipShare is used by more than 15
firms in cluster 1). The tags in cluster 2 indicate that most firms are partnerships. The tags in
cluster 5 indicate that insurance premiums are important to insurance business and the firms are
also in the reinsurance business. The tags in cluster 6 indicate that firms sell products with
warranty, use elaborate financing and compensation methods, and are engaged in acquisition of
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other businesses. All these findings are useful but cannot be derived in any way from firms’
NAICS codes. These preliminary findings are very promising to support our hypothesis. Since
there are hundreds of frequently used tags in 20 clusters, I plan to analyze them all to better
understand the clustering results and fully test my hypothesis.
2.2.3.4 CONCLUSION
Prior research attempt to identify firm groups based on the operation process and output
of firms. The interrelation and interdependence among firms are not captured. In this study, I
introduce a spectral clustering method to cluster firms based on XBRL- based financial
statements. Similar to other "social networks", the firm-tag network has natural groupings of
firms’ financial statements. My work demonstrates the feasibility of clustering firms based on
XBRL tags and shows that clusters exhibit interesting common features of the firms within the
same cluster.
2.3

SOCIAL MEDIA

2.3.1 INTRODUCTION
According to Kaplan and Haenlein (2010)'s definition, social media is "a group of
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web
2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content." (pp. 61). This
definition suggests that Web2.0 based applications and User Generated Content are the two key
featuresof social media. Social media is distinct from traditional media as it emphasizes greater
collaboration among users. At the same time, users on social media are more involved in the
creation of content and have more control over it(Kaplan & Haenlein, 2009). As a collective of
online communications channels, social media is composed of various platforms that can provide
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different social actions. For instance, Facebook is a popular social media website that allows
users to send messages, post photos, and share various apps with friends. In contrast, LinkedIn is
a business-oriented social networking site. The goal of this website is to help users establish
connections with industry experts and business partners. Currently, social media has become an
essential part of people's life. Noticing the potential benefits of social media, more and more
businesses begin to use social media to conduct marketing research, promote products, and build
long-term relationships with customers.
2.3.2 BENEFITS OF SOCIAL MEDIA
Compared to traditional communication channels, social media platforms allow firms to
reach a large amount of audience at lower cost. This feature makes it easier for businesses to
increase brand recognition, improve brand loyalty and build stronger relationships with
customers(He, Tian, Chen, & Chong, 2016). De Vries, Gensler, and Leeflang (2012) analyze the
social media data of eleven international companies. They find that brand loyalty is positively
associated with positive posts on social media platform. Trainor, Andzulis, Rapp, and Agnihotri
(2014) examine the relationship between social media technology usage and customer
relationship. Their findings suggest that social media technology investments have a positive
impact on social CRM capabilities as social media can facilitate the interaction between
businesses and customers. Laroche, Habibi, Richard, and Sankaranarayanan (2012) also find the
positive relationship between social media and brand loyalty. In general, these studies show that
social media can enhance self-identity of the community, which in turn, create the value for both
customers and companies.
While social media enable businesses to communicate with customers using two-way
participatory media model, the speed and easiness in transporting and sharing information on
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social media allow users to acquire unbiased information much easier than before(Yi, Oh, & Kim,
2013). Blankespoor et al. (2013) use Twitter as the example to examine the relationships
between social media information disclosure, firm's information environment and information
asymmetry. They find that firm-initiated news disseminated by Twitter have negative influence
on abnormal bid-ask spreads. Their finding suggests that dissemination of information via social
media can significantly reduce information asymmetry in capital markets. He et al. (2016)
analyze and compare the social media content on the Facebook sites of the three largest
drugstore chains. They find that customers use social media comments to provide suggestions to
these companies. He et al's study suggests that businesses can use the knowledge they gain from
social media to develop better business strategies and improve competitive advantages in the
market.
2.4

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Accounting information is a useful tool for banks to evaluate borrowers’ default risk. The

richer accounting information banks have, the more likely the banks can accurately assess the
default risk of borrowers(Healy & Palepu, 2001). Among various tools providing accounting
information, financial statement has been widely used by analysts, investors and the government
in the capital markets(Chong & Zhu, 2012). Traditionally, financial statement was prepared and
generated in unstructured format. Many resources were wasted on locating, converting, and
understanding accounting information in financial statement. The application of XBRL makes it
possible for users to retrieve accounting information in a more efficient way. Compared to
traditional approaches, XBRL can define taxonomies to specify a set of concepts. When all users
are using the same taxonomies, data in XBRL format can be easily shared across various
applications and platforms(Farewell, 2006). A research conducted by Pinsker and Li (2008)
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indicates that XBRL benefits include cost savings, increased data processing capability,
increased efficiency, decreased data redundancy, and decreased cost of bookkeeping. Overall,
XBRL based disclosures have the potential to reduce information risk and information
asymmetry in the capital markets(Kim, Kim, & No, 2011). While information risk and
information asymmetry are closely associated with bank loan price, I expect a negative relation
between the adoption of XBRL and cost of bank loan. Based on this argument, I hypothesize:
H1a: Borrowers that adopt XBRL enjoy more favorable loan prices
The main shortcomings of traditional media are that: 1) it can't disseminate the
information to a broad set of stakeholders; 2) information disseminated to the markets are often
biased (Bushee et al., 2010; Miller, 2006; Soltes, 2010). For instance, Heinle and Verrecchia
(2015) suggest that the extent to which firms bias their disclosure depends on the content of the
information disclosed by other firms or if there is a potential value to firms' stock prices. Frankel
and Li (2004) suggest that large firms are concerned by more followers. Analysts’
recommendations on large firms are often less biased than on small firms. Coombs (2007) finds
that negative information created by hostile competitors often harm firm's image and value.
Compared to traditional media, social media utilizes a two way broadcast model to disseminate
information. This feature enable firms to efficiently reach a large number of stakeholders (Yi et
al., 2013). Basically, the data available on social media can be classified into two categories:
firm-initiated information and user generated information (Bushee et al., 2010; Lee, Hutton, &
Shu, 2015). Firm-initiated information is created by firms and reflects firms' own opinion. On the
other hand, postings or comments created by general users belong to user-generated information
that represents users' opinions and views. Considering the huge amount of users on social media,
user generated information can provide a source of value-relevant advices to other stakeholders.
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For instance, Antweiler and Frank (2004) apply sentiment analysis to analyze 1.5 million
messages from Yahoo! Finance. The result of their study shows that postings on social media
are positively associated with firm's stock returns on the next day. Das and Chen (2007) analyze
small investor's sentiment on stock message boards. They find that social media postings are
related to stock index levels, volumes and volatility. Chen et al. (2014) use posts and comments
on Seeking Alpha.com to examine the effect of users' sentiment on stock prices. They find that
negative sentiment can negatively predict stock returns in a three-month period. Overall, the
studies above imply that the sentiment in large amount of postings is an important indicator of
firm's potential risks and values. Since borrower's risks are positively associated with bank loan
prices, I have the hypothesis below:
H1b: Borrowers with more positive postings and comments on social media enjoy more
favorable loan prices.
A number of studies have examined the impact of firm size on information asymmetry
and loan terms. For instance, Dennis and Sharpe (2005) identify three influence factors related to
firm size. The first factor is the bargaining power. Most large firms are well organized and they
have significant profits. The reputation built over long time makes it easier for large firms to
build a close relationship with lenders. As a result, the loan bargaining power of large firms is
stronger than small firms. From lenders' perspective , it's reasonable for them to offer favorite
loan contracts to large firms since the creditworthiness of large firms is easier to evaluate
(Diamond, 1989). On the other hand, large firms are less likely to rely on the loans from single
lender and market. More borrowing options enable large firms to receive relatively good terms
from multiple lenders. The second influence factor is the transaction cost. Compared to larger
firms, the amount of small firm loan is relatively small. The fixed costs incurred by the
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transaction make it harder for lenders to get economies of scale from small loans. Thus, lenders
are reluctant to offer favorable loan terms to small firms. The third influence factor is
information asymmetry. Shen and Reuer (2005) find that large firms have tighter regulation
requirements to disclose information, thus large firms is more efficient at minimizing
information asymmetry. Easley and O'hara (2004) suggest that large firms disclose more
information than small firms, which result in reduced information asymmetry and lower cost of
capital.
Beside the amount of information disclosed, firm size also has negative impact on the
quality and scope of information disclosed. For instance, press is an important tool to
disseminate information generated by sources like analysts, legal suits, and auditor changes.
Miller (2006) examines the role of press in the rebroadcasting stage. He finds that press is often
biased toward coverage of large firms because they tend to cater to interests of main readers. Das,
Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998) study the determinant of cross-section differences in
analyst forecasting. They find that large firms are generally followed by more analysts. Analyst
forecasts for large firms are less biased than those for small firms. Das et al's study shows that
small firms have less opportunity to get favorable loan terms due to the disadvantages of
information dissemination in traditional media channels. In general, prior findings indicate that 1)
the information of the small firms is often opaque; 2) disclosures of small firms are often biased;
3) disclosures of small firms cannot reach the public in a broad and correct manner. These
studies also imply that banks may have to rely more on alternative tools (e.g., social media and
XBRL) to evaluate the risk of small firms. Based on this argument, I hypothesize:
H2a: The effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for small firms than
for large firms.
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H2b: The effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for small firms
than for large firms.
Some studies find that prior borrowing relationship is associated with loan price. For
instance, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find that the scope of a relationship increase the
probability of getting loans from that bank. Berger and Udell (1995) suggest that prior
relationships will generate valuable information of borrower quality. This argument is confirmed
by their findings, which longer banking relationships are associated with lower interest rates and
fewer collateral requirements. Petersen and Rajan (1994) examine the relationship among prior
relationships, loan availability and loan cost. They find that while prior relationships do affect
the loan availability, there are only very small effects on the loan price. Bharath, Dahiya,
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) 's research focuses on the main risks in bank loan. They identify
three effects of prior loan relationships on bank loan. The first effect is adverse selection
concerns reduction. When the lenders have prior relationships with the borrowers, multiple
interactions allow lenders to collect borrowers' inside information, which is hard to gather
through other channels. In this case, adverse selection risks are reduced. The second effect is
syndicate moral hazard reduction. Syndicate moral hazard results from information asymmetries
among lenders. In the syndicated loan, the lead lender is responsible for the cost of monitoring
borrowers. Since loan is divided among more than one lender, the lead lender may not endeavor
to monitor the borrowers efficiently as the single loan. In order to compensate for the potential
loss caused by inefficient monitoring, the other syndicate members will demand tighter loan
terms. As prior relationships reduce information asymmetry and lower the cost of future
monitoring, the possibility of syndicate moral hazard is reduced. The third effect is borrower
moral hazard reduction. Borrower moral hazard is a risk results from information asymmetry
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between borrowers and lenders. The borrower moral hazard is raised when lenders cannot
observe or predict the borrower’s risky activities (Hölmstrom, 1979). As prior loan relationships
make it easier for lenders to monitor and control the borrower, the possibility of borrower moral
hazard is reduced. As lenders can benefit a lot from the information gathered from prior
borrowing relationship, they will be less likely to rely on other information sources (Berger &
Udell, 1995; Harhoff & Körting, 1998; Petersen & Rajan, 1994). On the other hand, when
lenders have limited access to the private information of new borrowers, they may have to rely
more on other information sources such as XRBL and social media to evaluate borrowers’ risks.
Based on this argument, I hypothesize:
H3a: The effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for loans in new
relationships than for loans in existing relationships
H3b: The effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for loans in
new relationships than for loans in existing relationships
A syndicated loan is a loan issued to the borrowers jointly by more than one lender. The
motivation of syndication stems from lenders' demands to spread risk, enhance income or reduce
costs(Pennacchi, 1988). In a syndicated loan, each participant is responsible for a share of the
loan. And, only the lead lender supervises the arrangement of the syndication including loan
terms negotiation, borrower monitoring and administration of repayments(Simons, 1993). A risk
will rise when there is information asymmetry between lead lender and other participants. Sufi
(2007) suggests that the lead lender may not endeavor to monitor the borrowers since borrower
monitoring is costly and lead lender owns only part of the loan. He calls this kind of risk as
syndicate moral hazard. Consistent with Sufi's finding, Hasan et al. (2012) find that syndicate
members rely more on public information due to risk of the syndicate moral hazard. Since XBRL
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and social media allow users to retrieve public information more efficiently, I expect that lenders
will rely more on XBRL and social media sentiment in loan contracting. Thus, I hypothesize:
H4a: The effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated loans
than for sole-owner loans
H4b: The effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated
loans than for sole-owner loans
Banks use various non-price terms to minimize information problems and control loan
risks. The most popular non-price loan terms are loan maturities, collateral, and covenants(Hasan
et al., 2012). Many studies find that higher information asymmetry, greater uncertainty and lower
firm quality of the borrowers lead to shorter maturities and more requirements of collateral
(Barclay & Smith, 1995; Ortiz-Molina & Penas, 2008; Rajan & Winton, 1995). For instance,
Flannery (1986) suggests that the relationship between borrower's quality and loan maturity is
linear. Borrowers with good quality may prefer shorter maturity when the transaction costs are
high. Diamond (1991a) examines the determinants of loan maturities from two aspects:
information asymmetries and the liquidity risk of refinancing. He argues that long maturity
allows borrowers to minimize liquidity risk, and borrowers with average quality will prefer long
maturity to avoid changes of loan prices. On the other hand, short-term loan enables lenders to
monitor borrowers more frequently. Thus, low quality borrowers are more likely to receive loans
with short maturities. Diamond (1991a) points out that even both high quality borrowers and low
quality borrowers use short term loan, they are driven by different mechanisms: different
bargaining power determinates that low quality borrowers are forced to accept short term loan
while high quality borrowers choose short term loan on their own initiative. Barclay and Smith
(1995) and Ortiz-Molina and Penas (2008) get similar results with Flannery's findings. Both of
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their studies suggest that shorter maturities are useful in solving information problems. The
reason is that lenders can periodically gather borrowers' private information through short-term
loan renewal processes. Applying Diamond's theory, Bharath et al. (2011) examines the effects
of lending relationships on loan contract terms. They find that lenders are more likely to monitor
low quality borrowers more intensively, and the quality of borrowers is key determination of
loan maturity length. In sum, the literature suggests that shorter maturities facilitate continual
monitoring, which in turn reduces the information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.
As I discussed above, the adoption of XBRL and social media can reduce information
asymmetry between lenders and borrowers significantly. Thus, the substitution effect of XBRL
and social media will make loan maturity less important to lenders. At the same time, since
sentiment on social media sites is an important indicator of firm's risks, it is reasonable for us to
believe that social media sentiment is positively associated with the length of loan maturity. Thus,
I hypothesize:
H5a: Borrowers that adopt XBRL have longer loan maturities.
H5b: Borrowers with more positive postings and comments on social media have longer
loan maturities.
The literature has found that many factors including limited contract
enforceability(Albuquerque & Hopenhayn, 2004; Banerjee & Newman, 1993; Cooley, Marimon,
& Quadrini, 2004), high monitoring cost(Border & Sobel, 1987; Boyd & Smith, 1993; Gale &
Hellwig, 1985; Lacker, 1998; Townsend, 1979; Williamson, 1986), high loan risk(Holmstrom &
Tirole, 1997), efficient monitoring(Rajan & Winton, 1995), and adverse selection(Berger,
Espinosa-Vega, Frame, & Miller, 2011; Duarte, 2011) are related to the use of loan collateral.
Most of these findings can be explained by adverse selection models and borrower moral hazard
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models(Bharath et al., 2011). According to adverse selection models, collateral and interest rate
are complementary. Higher quality borrowers may choose lower premiums without collateral,
while low quality borrowers will prefer higher premiums with collateral. At this point, collateral
plays a role in signaling borrower quality (Beaudry & Poitevin, 1995; Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981;
Whette, 1983). Borrower moral hazard models explain the motivation of collateral from another
aspect. These models suggest that the use of collateral is to compensate for potential losses
caused by information asymmetries. Banks are more likely to require collateral from borrowers
with low information transparency, while borrowers with high information transparency are less
likely to be required to do so(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997; Stulz & Johnson, 1985). In general, the
literature indicates that information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders play an important
role in the use of loan collateral. As the adoption of XBRL can reduce information asymmetry, I
expect that the adoption of XBRL will lessen lenders' need for collateral. On the other hand,
positive sentiment on social media sites indicates better borrowers' quality and lower loan risks.
Therefore, I expect that lenders are less likely to require collateral from the borrowers with more
positive sentiment. Based on these arguments, I hypothesize:
H6a: Banks are less likely to require collateral from borrowers that adopt XBRL
H6b: Banks are less likely to require collateral from borrowers with more positive
postings and comments on social media.
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3. METHODOLOGY
3.1

BANK LOAN PRICING ANALYTICS SYSTEM
The objectives of this study are to investigate whether and how the adoption of XBRL

and social media sentiment affect bank loan price. In order to achieve these objectives, I develop
a Bank Loan Pricing Analytics System (BLPAS) to collect, integrate, and analyze data from
multiple data resources. Figure 4 shows the framework for loan price analytics. This system is
composed of three key components: data collection module, data integration module and data
processing module.
[Insert Figure 4 here]

3.1.1 DATA COLLECTION MODULE
The Data Collection Module manages the data collected from various data sources. This
module integrates a number of data collection tools.
1. Web-crawling: currently, many social media tools offer application programming
interfaces (API) for users to retrieve data from their platforms. For instance, on Twitter platform,
REST API allows developers to access core Twitter data including author profile, follower data,
and user information. Streaming APIs enable users to retrieve updates of Tweets
synchronously(Twitter, 2016). As the social media data sources used in this study do not provide
APIs for data tracking, I develop a web-crawling application to retrieve the content from the
websites. By analyzing the URL and particular HTML tags of web pages, this application allows
users to retrieve posting and comments published on Seeking Alpha and Yahoo finance.
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2. HTML parsing and RSS: Sec.gov offers RSS feeds which enable users to track the
URL of submitted financial statements. In order to retrieve financial statements from Sec.gov, I
develop a HTML parsing application to download and analyze the data. As XBRL based
financial statement uses XML and XSD as the file extensions, this program can easily
distinguish XBRL based financial statements from traditional financial statements.
3. Manual coping: Thomson and Compustat database offer extensive functions for users
to retrieve information, generate report through pre-defined criteria and Excel add-in. Therefore,
I manually collect bank loan data and firm accounting data from these two databases.
3.1.2 DATA INTEGRATION MODULE
A big challenge of loan data analytics is to integrate heterogeneous unstructured data
collected from different sources. Built on Apache Hadoop and Hive platform, the Data
Integration Module enables flexible data summarization, easy data querying, and analysis of
large volumes of data. The Data Integration Module is composed of two components: ETL
agents and Distributed Storage Platform.
1. ETL agents: The ETL agents aim to extract data from heterogeneous data sources,
clean collected data, and load the processed data into distributed storage platform. ETL agents
are deployed as server side applications using PHP and C# programming language. In order to
process different types of unstructured data such as txt files, Excel files, html files, I develop
multiple agents to extract and transform unstructured data. For instance, HTML pages contain
HTML tags and ads in HTML pages, which cannot be processed by Distributed Storage Platform
directly. Thus, HTML agent is used to analyze the structure of web pages, and to retrieve the
content of postings and comments. After cleaning and mapping data collected from web pages,
HTML agent loads the transformed social media data into Distributed Storage Platform.
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2. Hive Based Distributed Storage Platform (HBDSP): Bank loan price analysis involves
multiple big datasets including social media data, XBRL data, firm financial data, and bank loan
data. The large amount of data generated from various data sources makes it hard for traditional
storage platform to manage data with reliability and availability. In this case, Hive based
distributed storage platform (HBDSP) provides a flexible solution with the capabilities required
to support large scale datasets. The main advantages of HBDSP are that datasets are stored on
Hadoop Distributed File System (HDFS), which offers key features such as scalability and
redundancy on Hadoop platform. The SQL like Hive query language enables users who are
familiar with SQL to query and manage the data more efficiently(Chong & Shi, 2015; Thusoo et
al., 2009). Figure 5 shows the user interface of Hive Based Distributed Storage Platform.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
The main components of HBDSP include user interface, driver, compiler, metadata store ,
and execution engine. HBDSP allows users to use ODBC and JDBC API to create, insert, update,
and query structured data. Based on Leverenz (2016) 's approach, I define the query flow of
HBDSP which includes the following steps:
1. Data Analysis Module sends query to HBDSP through ODBC or JDBC API.
2. ODBC or JDBC driver sends query to compiler.
3. Compiler parses the query to check the syntax and the requirements of the query.
4. The compiler sends a request to Metadata store. After Metadata store returns the
metadata, compiler generates the execution plan.
5. Execution engine executes the execution plan.
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6. The execution engine sends the execution job to JobTracker, which is responsible
for the job assignment.
7. Data nodes return the results to driver through execution engine.
8. Driver returns the results of query to Data Analysis Module through ODBC or
JDBC API.
3.1.3 DATA ANALYSIS MODULE
The Data Analysis Module manages serials of analysis tools, which can be used to
conduct content analysis, sentimental analysis, statistical analysis et al. The key components of
this module include data exchange component, sentimental analysis tools and statistical analysis
tools.
1. Data exchange component. Bank loan price analysis involves various data formats
including txt file, csv file and database file et al. The transformation and sharing of data among
different applications are extremely important to data analysis. Data exchange component
provides a serial of functions to facilitate data exchange between analysis applications and Hive
platform. On the one hand, this component uses ODBC and JDBC API to retrieve and
manipulate data stored on Hive distributed storage system. On the other hand, this component
outputs results with multiple data formats, which can be accessed by various analysis tools. For
instance, SPSS is a major statistical tools used in this study. However, SPSS cannot access data
stored on Hive platform directly. The data exchange component offers a bi-directional data
exchange between SPSS and Hive platform with the following steps: 1). Users issue search
requests using standard SQL language. 2). Data exchange component transforms and sends
search requests to Hive platform. 3). Hive platform returns the results to Data exchange
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component. 4). Data exchange component transforms the format of the results to the data format
supported by SPSS. 5). Data exchange component sends the transformed results to SPSS.
2. Sentimental analysis tool. In this study, sentimental analysis tool is used to analyze
users' opinions expressed within social media postings and comments. Two sentiment scores are
calculated in the study. The first one is general sentiment score. This score is used to identify
general opinions of the users. I use AlchemyAPI (AlchemyAPI Inc, 2016) to calculate general
sentiment score. Compared to other Sentimental analysis tools, AlchemyAPI adopts hybrid
approaches including linguistic techniques, statistical analysis techniques and large-scale
learning techniques to identify the contents of sentences and phrases. These techniques enable
AlchemyAPI to better understand the sentiment expressed in the content and mine key entities
and topics more accurately(IBM, 2016). The second score is finance-related sentiment, which is
used to identify opinions related to financial information. Following Nann, Krauss, and Schoder
(2013)'s suggestion, I calculate finance-related sentiment based on predefined lists of positive(e.g.
invest, long, earn, etc) and negative words(e.g. bailout, breakout, sell, etc). The final sentiment is
the combination of general sentiment and finance-related sentiment.
3. Statistical analysis tools. Statistical analysis tools include two popular statistical
packages: SPSS and R. As a frequently used statistical analysis tool, SPSS allows users to
conduct most complex statistical analyses and easily generate summary reports, charts and
descriptive statistics (Hayes & Matthes, 2009). In this study, SPSS is used to conduct most of the
statistical analyses and generate reports of the analyses. Another statistical analysis tool used in
this study is R. As an integrated suite of statistical analysis, R integrates most popular statistical
techniques and has more than 4000 packages for data analysis. The R programming language
allows users to add, use, and modify functionalities. This feature makes R more extensible than
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other statistical analysis tools(The R Foundation, 2016). In this study, I conduct robustness
analysis on R environment.
Besides the tools introduced above, data analysis module also provides simple and
flexible interfaces for future system expansion. Future analytic applications can use JDBC API,
ODBC API and XML to exchange data with current analysis tools and Hive storage platform.
3.2

DATA SOURCE
In this study, XBRL data is collected from the archive of financial statements on

www.sec.gov. According to SEC's requirements, the adoption of XBRL is phased in three stages.
In the first stage, all domestic and foreign large accelerated filers matching certain conditions
(use U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), have a worldwide public float of
greater than $5 billion as of the end of the second fiscal quarter of their most recently completed
fiscal year, fiscal periods ending on or after June 15, 2009) are required to provide financial
statement information in XBRL. In the second stage, all other domestic and foreign large
accelerated filers matching certain conditions (use U.S. GAAP, fiscal period ending on or after
June 15, 2010), are required to include interactive data (XBRL) in their financial statements. In
the third stage, all remaining filers including foreign private issuers using International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS) matching certain conditions(fiscal periods ending on or after June 15,
2011), are required to include interactive data(XBRL) in their financial reporting(Securities
Exchange Commission, 2009). Since the adoption of XBRL was not mandatory for all
companies from 2009 to 2011, some companies adopted XBRL while others did not during three
years. This circumstance makes it possible for me to examine the impact of XBRL adoption on
bank loan price. Before June 15, 2009, no companies were required to provide financial
statement information in XBRL. The adoption of XBRL did not have any impact on bank loan
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price before 2009. On the other hand, the rule of SEC requires all companies to submit their
financial information in XBRL after June 15, 2011. Bank loan price were not related to the
adoption of XBRL after 2011 since all borrowers included XBRL in their financial statement
after that deadline. For the above reasons, I collect data of XBRL adoption in the period from
2009 to 2011.
Bank loan data is obtained from Thomson one database. Thomson one provides detailed
financial information such as earnings estimates, financial news, transaction data, mergers and
acquisitions, ownership profiles and analysts’ reports. More importantly, this database contains
over 92,000 syndicated loans since 1982. Key loan terms such as corporate profile of borrowers
and lenders, deal dates, interest rate, collateral, covenants, maturities are well covered by this
database(Thomson Reuters, 2016). While Thomson one provides detailed loan information,
some firm-specific accounting information such as tangibility, profitability, financial ratios,
leverage are not included in the database. In this case, I use Compustat to obtain firm-specific
accounting information. As I only examine the adoption of XBRL from 2009 to 2011, the bank
loans made at the end of 2011 enable me to evaluate the comprehensive impact of XBRL on
bank loan price. Thus, I collect bank loan data in a period from August 1, 2011 to December 31,
2011. To ensure data integrity and data consistency, I use ticker symbols to match the records
collected from Thomson one, Compustat and SEC.gov.
Social media data is collected from two financial social networking websites, Yahoo
Finance and Seeking alpha. Yahoo Finance is a leading financial data website, which has more
than 70 million visitors each month. This website provides financial news, stock quotes, press
releases, financial reports and financial analysis(Wikipedia, 2016). As an important part of
Yahoo finance, Yahoo Message Board allows investors and analysts to share their opinions and
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views on companies all over the world. Figure 6 shows the message board of Microsoft on
Yahoo finance. One key feature of Yahoo message board is that for each post on the board, users
can reply and click the sentiment label to indicate their preferences to the post. The huge
amounts of posts and comments on Yahoo Message Board make it easier for me to mine
sentiments of millions of users. The second social media data source, Seeking Alpha is one of the
biggest financial social media websites in the U.S. The aim of Seeking Alpha is to provide
professional opinion and analysis written by experts(Chen et al., 2014). In order to assure quality
of the articles, the articles submitted to Seeking Alpha are reviewed by a panel. The breadths and
depth of the articles on Seeking Alpha are much better than other websites(Seeking Alpha,
2016a). Similar to Yahoo finance, users of Seeking Alpha are free to leave comments on articles
that they are interested in. Figure 7 shows the example articles and comments of Microsoft on
Seeking Alpha.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
[Insert Figure 7 here]
Before making a loan decision, it requires a long time for lenders to collect borrower's
information and evaluate potential loan risks. Therefore, social media views and opinions
published in a short time period may not be fully noticed or evaluated by lenders. In order to
improve the accuracy of this study, I collect social media data in the four-month period prior to
the loan announcement date.
3.3

SAMPLE SELECTION
In order to ensure the accuracy and consistency of the data collected from multiple data

sources. I use the following procedures to form the sample:
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1. First, I retrieve all loan-facility-level records from Thomson one database in a period
from August 1, 2011 to December 31, 2011. While the data of private or non-US companies are
not completely covered by SEC.gov and social media websites, I limit my sample to listed US
companies.
2. Following Hasan et al. (2012)'s definition, I measure the loan price as the basis points
over LIBOR or LIBOR equivalent. In this step, I exclude all records without available LIBOR
price.
3. Collect borrowers' 10-K submission from SEC.gov in a period from January 1, 2009 to
December 31, 2011. Exclude all borrowers without submission of 10-k during this period and
borrowers being delisted during this period. I also manually check the names of all borrowers.
Borrowers without consistent names on SEC.gov and Thomson one are excluded.
4. Collect borrower-related articles, and comments from Yahoo message board and
Seeking Alpha in a four-month period prior to each loan announcement date. Borrowers without
posts on these two sites or have inconsistent company names are excluded.
Finally, I get 554 loan records. Table 9 shows the details of sample selection.
[Insert Table 9 here]

3.4

VARIABLE MEASUREMENT

3.4.1 BANK LOAN PRICE
Loan price is one of the key variables in this study. A number of prior studies use spread
as the measurement of loan price (Beatty, Weber, & Yu, 2008; Hasan et al., 2012; Liu, Seyyed,
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& Smith, 1999; Zhang, 2008). Following these studies, I use the initial interest rate spread over
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) to measure bank loan price.
3.4.2 THE ADOPTION OF XBRL
Following Kim et al. (2011)'s approach, I construct the adoption of XBRL measure by
examining borrowers ' 10-K submission from 2009 to 2011. The value of this variable equals to
the frequency of the adoption of XBRL between 2009 and 2011. For instance, if a firm submitted
its financial information in XBRL once between 2009 and 2011, then the value of this variable is
equal to one. Since the time period only covers three fiscal years, the scale of XBRL adoption is
from 0 to 3. Based on the discussion in chapter 2, I expect that the frequency of XBRL adoption
is negatively related to loan prices.
3.4.3 SOCIAL MEDIA SENTIMENT
The sentiment on social media websites reflects user's opinions about firm's risks and
values. According to prior discussion, I expect that social media sentiment is negatively related
to loan prices. Based on the algorithm provided by IBM(AlchemyAPI Inc, 2016), I calculate
social media sentiment using the following stages:
1. Calculate financial terms sentiment score of each post

Finseni

=

( 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 _𝑃(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖 )− 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 _𝑁( 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖 )
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 _𝐴𝑙𝑙 (𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑖 )

(1)

Where 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑃(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ) returns the number of positive financial terms in post i.
𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝑁( 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 ) returns the number of negative financial terms in post i. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡_𝐴𝑙𝑙(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 )
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returns the number of all financial terms in post i. This formula returns the finance-related
sentiment score of post i.
2. Calculate general sentiment score,

StandSeni

= AlchemyAPI( posti )

(2)

Where posti is the content of post i. By calling AlchemyAPI, this formula returns the general
sentiment score of post i.
3. Calculate total sentiment score,

Sentiment_Score =

𝒏
( 𝒏
𝒊=𝟎 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑆𝑒𝑛 𝒊 + 𝒊=𝟎 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑆𝑒𝑛 𝒊 )
2𝑛

(3)

Where FinSeni is the finance-related sentiment score of post i. StandSeni is general sentiment
score of post i. n is the number of all posts over a specific time period. This formula returns the
total sentiment score of a company over a specific time period.
3.4.4 CONTROL VARIABLES
Prior studies find that some firm characteristics also affect loan price (Graham, Li, & Qiu,
2008; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Wu et al., 2011). Following these studies, I control for several firm
characteristics and loan characteristics in my models.
Log(Asset), prior studies find that firm size has positive impact on information
transparency(Dennis & Sharpe, 2005). The information of the small firms is often opaque. While
information transparency plays an important role in loan prices, I expect that firm size has a

40
negative impact on bank loan prices. In this study, I use the natural logarithm of the total assets
of borrowers as the measurement of firm size.
Leverage, I define leverage as the total debts including long-term debt and short-term
debt divided by firm book assets. As an important indicator of default risk and liquidity
risk(Diamond, 1991a; Graham et al., 2008), high leverage often suggests that firms have higher
default risk and liquidity risk. Thus, I expect leverage is positively associated with loan prices.
Current Ratio and Cash to Debt Ratio, in this study, current ratio is defined as the current
assets divided by current liability, cash to debt ratios is measured by total cash divided by total
debt. According to the literature, lower current ratios and lower cash to debt ratios suggest that
firms have higher default risk (Graham et al., 2008). Thus, I expect a negative relation between
current ratio, cash to debt ratio and loan prices.
Profitability, I measure profitability as Net income over total sales. While higher
profitability means lower loan risks, I expect that profitability is negatively associated with loan
prices.
Interest Coverage, I measure interest coverage as Earnings Before Interest & Tax (EBIT)
divided by total interest expense. This variable reflects firm's ability to pay the interest charges
on time. Low interest coverage often suggests that firm does not have enough cash to pay off
interest charges. Thus, I expect that interest coverage is negatively associated with loan prices.
Tangibility, I define tangibility as property, plant, and equipment divided by total asset.
As tangible assets are potential guarantee for banks to recover from default (Hasan et al., 2012), I
expect a negative relationship between tangibility and loan prices.
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MB, this variable is defined as market to book ratio that indicates growth opportunities of
a firm. Since better growth opportunities result in lower loan cost(Kothari et al., 2009), I expect
that MB is negatively associated with loan prices.
Loan Size, I define Loan Size as the total amount of bank loan. Hasan et al. (2012)
suggest that lenders can achieve economies of scale when offering large amount of loan. As large
loan size is associated with lower lending cost, I expect a negative relationship between Loan
Size and loan prices.
Prior Relations, is a dummy variable that is equal to one when there is a previous lending
relationship between lenders and borrowers, it equals zero otherwise. A number of studies have
examined the relationship between repeated borrowing and loan prices. Boot (2000) argues that
repeated interaction between the same lender and borrower will facilitate production of durable
and reusable information. Bharath et al. (2011) suggest that previous borrowing relationship can
reduce information asymmetries, and lending cost. According to their studies, previous
borrowing relationship contributes to 10–17 bps lower loan spreads. Based on the findings of
literature, I expect a negative relationship between Prior Relations and loan prices.
Z-Score, Z-Score is a measurement of default risk. Follow Hasan et al. (2012) 's
approach, I define Z-Score as (1.2*Working capital+1.48Retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT +
0.999*Sales)/Total assets. As lower Z-Score is associated with higher default risk, I expect a
negative relationship between Z-Score and loan prices
The literature finds that some other variables such as loan type, loan purpose and industry
also have impact on loan prices(Graham et al., 2008; Hasan et al., 2012). Following these studies,
I control for loan type, loan purpose, and industry effects. In this study, loan type is classified
into five categories: term loan, term loan B-D, revolver, 364-Day Facility and others. Loan
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purpose is classified into seven categories: acquisition lines, LBO, Takeover, debt repayment,
corporate purpose, working capital, and others. For the industry effects, I use one digit SIC
dummies to control for it.
3.5

EMPIRICAL MODELS
To examine the effect of adoption of XBRL and social media on bank loan price, I

specify the following empirical models:
Log(Spread) = f(Constant, XBRL adoption, Firm characteristics, Loan characteristics,
Industry effects)

(4)

The first model is used to test whether and how the adoption of XBRL affect bank loan
price. The explicit form of equation (1) above is represented as follows:
Log(Spread) = α0 + α1(XBRL adoption) + α2 log(Assets) + α3Leverage
+ α4Current Ratio + α5Cash to Debt Ratio + α6Interest Coverage
+ α7Tangibility + α8Profitability + α9M/B + α10Log(Loan size)
+ α11Prior Relation + Loan type effect + Loan purpose effect
+ Industry effect + ε

(5)

Where Log(Spread) is the natural logarithm of initial interest rate spread over London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR). XBRL adoption equals to the frequency of the adoption of XBRL
between 2009 and 2011. I expect a negative relationship between XBRL adoption, firms
size(Assets), Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Interest Coverage, Tangibility, Profitability,
M/B, Loan Size, Prior Relation and loan prices and a positive relationship between Leverage and
loan prices.
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The second model is used to examine the effect social media sentiment on loan prices by
using the following model:
Log(Spread) = f(Constant, Social Media Sentiment, Firm-specific variables ,
loan-specific variables, other control variables)

(6)

The explicit form of equation (6) above is represented as follows:
Log(Spread) = α0 + α1(Social Media Sentiment) + α2 log(Assets) + α3Leverage
+ α4Current Ratio + α5Cash to Debt Ratio + α6Interest Coverage
+ α7Tangibility + α8Profitability + α9M/B + α10Log(Loan size)
+ α11Prior Relation + Loan type effect + Loan purpose effect
+ Industry effect + ε

(7)

Where social media sentiment is the sentiment score calculated by formulas mentioned in section
3.4.3. I expect a negative relationship between social media sentiment, firms size(Assets),
Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Interest Coverage, Tangibility, Profitability, M/B, Loan size,
Prior Relation and loan prices and a positive relationship between Leverage and loan prices.
In the third model, I add the interaction of social media sentiment and XBRL adoption in
the regression. The model examines the comprehensive effects of XBRL adoption and social
media sentiment on bank loan price:
Log(Spread) = f(Constant, XBRL adoption, Social Media Sentiment,
XBRL adoption × social media sentiment, Firm-specific variables,
loan-specific variables, other control variables)
The explicit form of equation (8) above is represented as follows:

(8)
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Log(Spread) = α0 + α1(XBRL adoption) +α2(Social Media Sentiment)
+α3(XBRL adoption× Social Media Sentiment) + α4 log(Assets)
+α5Leverage + α6Current Ratio + α7Cash to Debt Ratio
+α8Interest Coverage + α9Tangibility + α10Profitability + α11M/B
+α12Log(Loan size) + α13Prior Relation + Loan type effect
+Loan purpose effect + Industry effect + ε

(9)

I expect that interaction of social media sentiment and XBRL adoption is negatively associated
with loan cost.
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4. FINDINGS AND ANALYSES
In this chapter, I will discuss the results of the regression analysis: The descriptive
statistics of the dependent and independent variables are provided in section 4.1. The correlation
analyses between dependent and independent variables are also discussed in this section. Section
4.2 and section 4.3 presents the regression results related to the effects of XBRL adoption, and
social media sentiment on loan prices. After discussing the results of robust test in section 4.4,
section 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 investigate whether the effect of XBRL and social media sentiment on
bank loan prices varies with borrower characteristics and loan characteristics (e.g. new
relationship, syndication, and firm size). Finally, section 4.8 discusses the regression results
regarding the relations between the adoption of XBRL, social media sentiment and non-price
terms.
4.1

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 10 presents descriptive statistics for dependent variables, independent variables and

a set of control variables in our models. The mean of bank loan spread is 199.621 with a median
value of 175, minimum value of 5 and maximum value of 1150. The bank loan spread highly
dispersed from its mean value with the standard deviation of 123.194. The mean of XBRL is
0.894 with a median value of 1, minimum value of 0 and maximum value of 2. This result
indicates that the maximum times borrowers adopted XBRL between 2009 and 2011 is two, and
most of the borrowers only used XBRL one time during that period. The mean of Seeking
Aplaha sentiment is 0.217 with a median value of 0.221, minimum value of -0.706, and
maximum value of 1.200. The mean of Yahoo finance sentiment is 0.026 with a median value of
-0.002, minimum value of 1.161, and maximum value of 1.350. The statistics of two social
media sites show that the sentiment of Seeking Aplaha is more positive than the sentiment of
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Yahoo finance. Some other borrower firm characteristics, such as Current Ratio, Tangibility, and
Interest Coverage, also vary across our sample.
[Insert Table 10 here]
For the loan characteristics, the result reveals that the sample’s average loan highly

dispersed from its mean value as the mean of loan size $700M with a median value of $350m,
minimum value of $5M and maximum value of $15,000M. Other loan characteristics including
maturities, collateral, and relations vary considerably across the sample. The mean value of
maturities is 53 months. The maximum and minimum values of maturities are 85 months and 3
months respectively. The standard deviation of 14 shows little dispersion of maturities from its
mean. The mean and median value of secured is 0.128 and 0, only 12.8% of the sample loans
have collateral requirements. This result also indicates that most of the borrowers (69%) have
prior relations with lenders. The mean of relation is 0.690 with a median value of 1, minimum
value of 0 and maximum value of 1.
Correlation is a way to measure whether and how two or more variables are related to
each other. In this study, Pearson correlation coefficient is used to measure the correlation
between variables. Table 11 provides the result of Pearson correlation analysis. As expected, the
bank loan spreads are negatively correlated with Social Media postings at 5% level, and
negatively correlated with XBRL adoption at 1% level. This result shows the preliminary
evidence about the effect of XBRL and social media on bank loan spreads. Also, the highest
variance inflation factor (VIF) in our regression is only 5.800, which is below the suggested
multicollinearity problem threshold of 10(Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000) . This result
indicates that multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem in this study.
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[Insert Table 11 here]

4.2

XBRL ADOPTION AND BANK LOAN PRICE
In this section, I use OLS regression analysis to examine the relationship between XBRL

adoption and bank loan price, and the relationship between social media sentiment and bank loan
price. The regression results are reported in table 12.The dependent variable is the natural
logarithm of loan spread. In column 1, I use XBRL to measure the adoption of XBRL. Firm and
loan characteristics such as Asset, Leverage, Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Profitability,
Interest Coverage, Tangibility, MB, zscore, Loan Size, Prior Relations are also included in the
regression. Based on the discussion above, I control for industry effect, loan-type effect, and
loan-purpose effect in the regressions.
[Insert Table 12 here]
I find that the coefficient of XBRL is -0.132 and is significant at the 1% level (t = -3.242),
indicating that a 1% increase in XBRL adoption is related to about a 0. 132% decrease in bank
loan spread. This result shows that the effect of XBRL adoption on the bank loan price is
statistically significant. Other firm and loan characteristics including log(asset), Profitability,
MB, zscore are significantly negatively related to loan spread indicating that banks charge lower
interest rates to borrowers with higher earnings quality, more growth opportunities, and lower
loan risk. The coefficient of loan size is also negative and significant suggesting that the increase
of loan size will reduce monitoring costs of bank loan. However, while Cash to Debt Ratio,
Tangibility, and Prior Relations are negatively related to loan spread. These relations are not
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significant. This result indicates that some firm and loan characteristics only have a weak effect
on loan spread.
In sum, the results of Table 12 are consistent with H1a that adoption of XBRL reduces
information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, which enables lenders to offer favorable
loan price to borrowers.
4.3

SOCIAL MEDIA SENTIMENT AND BANK LOAN PRICE
In this study, I collect social media data from two websites: Yahoo Finance message

board and Seeking Alpha. As discussed above, the postings and comments on social media sites
represents users' opinions and views about specific firms. As the sentiment of online postings is
an indicator to firm's risks and market performance, I predict that the sentiment of online
postings is negatively associated with bank loan price. Column 2 and column 3 of table 12 report
the regression results related to two social media sites. The coefficient of Yahoo sentiment is .047(t=-.701). The p value is .484, which is not significant. This result indicates that Yahoo user
opinion only has a weak impact on bank loan price. Interestingly, I find that the coefficient of
Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.157, and is significant at the 5% level (t = -1.894). These results
indicate that a 1% increase in Seeking Alpha sentiment is related to about a 0.157 % decrease in
bank loan spread. Column 4 shows the how the interaction of XBRL adoption and social media
sentiment affect bank price. As I expected, the coefficients of the interaction is -0.284 and is
significant at the 5% level (t = -2.337). The result indicates that borrowers adopting XBRL and
receiving positive postings are more likely to get favorable loan price. In sum, the results of
Seeking Alpha data are consistent with H1b that social media sentiment is negatively associated
with loan price.
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According to the results in column2 and column3, predictive power between two social
media sites is different. In order to identify the cause of this difference, I perform further analysis
on the postings of these two sites. First, I conduct a pair t-test analysis to compare the postings
means. Table 13 shows the result of the analysis. The result indicates that there is a statistically
significant difference between the mean of Seeking Alpha sentiment and Yahoo sentiment. The
mean of seekingscore - yahoo is 0.26 indicating the mean of Seeking Alpha sentiment is 0.26
[Insert Table 13 here]
greater than the mean of Yahoo sentiment. Second, I randomly select 100 postings of the same
firm from both two websites. I find that the average word of Seeking Alpha is 34 while the
average word of Yahoo posting is 15. Table 14 shows the sample of Yahoo postings and Seeking
Alpha postings. By manually analyzing the content of these postings, I find that 23% of Yahoo
postings are unrelated to particular firm's risks or values while only 8% of Seeking Alpha
postings are unrelated to particular firm's risks or values. This result implies that focus and
quality of postings also have an impact on the predictive power of social media sentiment.
[Insert Table 14 here]
4.4

ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

4.4.1 CONTROLLING FOR FIRM CLUSTERING
In prior regressions, I control for industry effect, which is based on Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) System. A potential disadvantage of SIC is that it is a static system, which
cannot capture the evolvement of firm’s business and industry structure. As an additional
robustness check, I use a dynamic classification approach defined in section 2.2.3 to control for
industry effect. I first collect the 10-K annual financial statements of all listed firms from 2009 to
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2011. As some firms have more than one XBRL based 10-K from 2009 to 2011, I only choose
the earliest submission. A spectral clustering method is used to analyze the links between
companies and XBRL tags. Finally, 20 clusters are identified from 1799 filings. I then control for
cluster effect and re-estimate the regressions. Table 15 reports the regressions results. Similar to
the results in table 12, the coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.160 and is significant at the 1%
level, the coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.231 and is significant at the 5% level, the
coefficient of interaction between XBRL adoption and Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.162 and is
significant at the 1% level. These results suggest that SIC classification system did not influence
the primary results.
[Insert Table 15 here]

4.4.2 EXCLUSION OF FINANCIAL AND UTILITY FIRMS
Prior studies find that financial and utility firms are in regulated industries and may have
different loan costs compared to other firms(Hasan et al., 2012; Wu et al., 2011). To remove the
effect of these firms, I perform an analysis using a sample that excludes financial and utility
firms. Table 16 reports the regressions results. The coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.128 and is
significant at the 1% level, the coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.087 and is significant
at the 10% level, the coefficient of interaction between XBRL adoption and Seeking Alpha
sentiment is -0.087 and is significant at the 5% level. As the coefficients are very similar to those
in Table 12, I conclude that my results are not driven by financial and utility firms.
[Insert Table 16 here]
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4.4.3 MEDIAN REGRESSION
Following Hasan et al. (2012)'s suggestion, I perform a median regression to investigate
whether loans with extreme interest rates mislead the results. Table 17 shows the results of
median regression. The coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.108 and is significant at the 1% level,
the coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.0009 and is significant at the 5% level, the
coefficient of interaction between XBRL adoption and Seeking Alpha sentiment is -0.0007 and is
significant at the 10% level. These results indicate that outlier is unlikely to be a problem in this
study.
[Insert Table 17 here]
4.5

EFFECT OF FIRM SIZE
In this section, I first test H2a to see whether XBRL adoption has a stronger effect on

small-sized borrowers. I construct a dummy variable, Small firms, which equals one if a firm’s
assets are less than the sample median of total assets, and zero otherwise. I add Small firms, the
interaction of Small firms and XBRL adoption to the model and run the new regression. The
results are in column 1 of table 18. The coefficient of the interaction term between XBRL
adoption and Small firms is -0.052, p value is 0.421, which is not significant. The results suggest
that XBRL adoption does not have a stronger effect on loan prices of small-sized firms. In this
case, H2a is not supported.
[Insert Table 18 here]
Next, I test H2b to see whether the effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is
stronger for small firms. I add Small firms, the interaction of Small firms and social media
sentiment to the model and rerun the regression. Column2 of table 18 shows that the coefficient
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of the interaction term between social media sentiment and Small firms is 0.370 and is
significant at the 5% level. This result suggests that social media sentiment has a stronger effect
on loan prices of small-sized firms. Hence, H2b is supported.
4.6

EFFECT OF NEW RELATIONSHIP
To verify H3a that XBRL adoption has a stronger impact on new-relationship lending, I

construct a dummy variable, New Loans, which equals one if there is no previous lending
relationship between lenders and borrowers, and zero otherwise. I add New Loans, the
interaction of New Loans and XBRL adoption to the model and run the new regression. The
results are in column 1 of table 19. The coefficient of the interaction term between XBRL
adoption and New Loans is -0.05, p value is 0.385 that is not significant at the 10% level. The
result suggests that the effect of XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is not stronger for loans in
new relationships. In this case, H3a is not supported.
[Insert Table 19 here]
Next, I test H3b to see whether social media sentiment has a stronger impact on newrelationship lending. I add New Loans, the interaction of New Loans and social media sentiment
to the model and rerun the regression. Column2 of table 19 shows that the coefficient of the
interaction term is 0.270, and p value is 0.145, which is not significant at the 10% level. Hence,
H3b is not supported.
4.7

EFFECT OF SYNDICATION
In this section, I first test H4a to see whether XBRL adoption has a stronger impact on

syndicated lending. I construct a dummy variable, Syndication, which equals one if a loan is
offered by more than one lender, and zero otherwise. I add the Syndication, the interaction of

53
Syndication and XBRL adoption to the model and run the new regression. The results are in
column 1 of table 20. The coefficient of the interaction term between XBRL adoption and
Syndication is -0.577, p value is significant at the 1% level. The results suggest the effect of
XBRL adoption on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated loans than for sole-owner loans. In
this case, H4a is supported.
[Insert Table 20 here]
Next, I test H4b to see whether social media sentiment has a stronger impact on
syndicated lending. I add the Syndication, the interaction of Syndication and social media
sentiment to the model and rerun the regression. Column2 of table 20 shows that the coefficient
of the interaction term is 1.040, and p value is significant at the 10% level. The results suggest
the effect of social media sentiment on bank loan prices is stronger for syndicated loans than for
sole-owner loans Hence, H4b is supported.
4.8

XBRL ADOPTION, SOCIAL MEDIA SENTIMENT, AND NON-PRICE LOAN TERMS
Lenders use various non-price terms such as loan maturities and collateral to control loan

risk and minimize information problems. The literature has confirmed that higher information
asymmetry, greater uncertainty often result in shorter maturity, more requirements of collateral.
As XBRL and social media can reduce information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers
significantly, I hypothesize that borrowers that adopt XBRL and receive more positive postings
on social media are more likely to enjoy favorable non-price terms. This hypothesis is tested in
the following sections.
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4.8.1 LOAN MATURITY
In this section, I use a new regression model to test whether XBRL Adoption, Social
media sentiment affect loan maturities. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of
maturity. I use XBRL to measure the adoption of XBRL. Firm and loan characteristics such as
asset, leverage, Current Ratio, Cash to Debt Ratio, Profitability, Interest Coverage, Tangibility,
MB, zscore, loan size, Prior Relations are also included in the regression. I also control for
industry effect, loan-type effect, and loan-purpose effect in the regression. The results are in
column1 and column2 of table 21. The coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.007, p value is 0.872,
which is not significant at the 10% level. The result suggests the XBRL adoption is not related to
loan maturities. In this case, H5a is not supported. For the social media sentiment, The
coefficient is -0.029, p value is 0.718 that is also not significant at the 10% level. The result
indicates the social media sentiment does not affect loan maturities. Hence, H5b is not supported.
[Insert Table 21 here]

4.8.2 COLLATERAL
To test the effect of XBRL Adoption, Social media sentiment on collateral, I construct a
dummy variable, Secured, which equals one if a loan is secured by collateral, and zero otherwise.
Column 1 of table 22 shows the results. I find that the coefficient of XBRL adoption is -0.062
and is significant at the 10% level (t = -1.635), indicating that borrowers adopting XBRL are less
likely to be required to provide collateral. Hence, H6a is supported.
[Insert Table 22 here]
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Next, I test the relationship between Secured and social media sentiment. Column 2 of
table 22 shows the results. I find that the coefficient of social media sentiment is -0.079, p value
is 0.204, which is not significant at the 10% level. This result suggests that social media
sentiment does not have significant effect on the use of collateral. Hence, H6b is not supported.
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Many studies have demonstrated that XBRL and social media can facilitate the
information sharing and minimize information asymmetry in the stock markets. However, few
studies empirically test the relations between XRBL and bank loan contracting or relations
between social media and bank loan contracting. This study aims to fill this gap by examining
the influence of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment on bank loan contracting especially
the cost of loan. In the following sections, I summarize the results of this study and offer
recommendations for further research.
5.1

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS
The results of analyses support the idea that XBRL and social media can decrease data

redundancy, increase information-processing capability, and facilitate information sharing in the
capital markets. The main findings and implications of this study are listed as follows: First, the
analysis on XBRL adoption indicates that a 1% increase in XBRL adoption is related to about a
0.132% decrease in bank loan spreads after controlling for certain firm characteristics and loan
characteristics. This finding reveals that the XBRL can enhance accounting disclosures and
mitigate the information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders.
Second, the analysis on social media sentiment shows two different results. 1) While both
Yahoo sentiment and Seeking Alpha sentiment are negatively associated with loan spread, the
coefficient of Yahoo sentiment is insignificant, indicating that Yahoo user opinions only have a
very weak influence on loan price. 2) The coefficient of Seeking Alpha sentiment is significant at
the 5% level, suggesting that borrowers receive more positive postings on Seeking Alpha are
more likely to enjoy favorable loan price. Further analysis on the postings of these two sites
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shows that Yahoo postings are more "general" than Seeking Alpha postings. As most articles and
comments on Seeking Alpha were published and reviewed by professionals, the information
shared on this site has more influence on loan contracting. From this point, the focus and quality
of postings may result in different predictive power between Yahoo and Seeking Alpha. Overall,
the results of analyses confirm that social media facilitate information sharing and dissemination,
and social media sentiment is an important indicator of firm's potential risks and values.
Third, I find that XBRL adoption and social media user opinions have stronger effect on
syndicated lending than for sole-owner lending. Hasan et al. (2012) suggest that the members of
syndicated loans rely more on public information due to the risk of the syndicate moral hazard.
As XBRL and social media facilitate information sharing and retrieving, lenders of syndicated
loans are more likely to use these technologies to assess borrower's firm risk and default risk.
Therefore, XBRL and social media play a more important role in the syndicated loans.
Fourth, this study confirms the hypothesis that social media sentiment is more important
for small-sized borrowers. Prior studies indicate that small-sized firms have less opportunity to
get favorable loan terms due to high information asymmetry between lenders and them(Das et al.,
1998; Dennis & Sharpe, 2005). My findings suggest that social media can help mitigate
information asymmetry between lenders and small-sized borrowers. In this case, small-sized
firms can benefit more from social media in loan contracting.
Finally, according to the view of borrower moral hazard models, lenders use collateral to
compensate for potential losses caused by information risk and default risk. My study indicates
that the adoption of XBRL can reduce the incidence of collateral. I interpret this finding as the
evidence that XBRL has the potential to reduce lenders' reliance on traditional non-price loan
terms because it can improve transparency and efficiency for loan contracting.
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Besides the hypotheses confirmed by this study, some non-significant results also have
implications for the literature. First, the analysis shows that XBRL adoption does not have a
stronger effect on loan price for small-sized firms. One possible explanation of this result is that
XBRL adoption affects loan contracting in multiple ways. While XBRL makes it easier for
lenders to evaluate the risk of small firms, large companies also benefit a lot from XBRL
adoption. For instance, Roohani (2003) suggest that advantage of adopting XBRL is greater for
large companies because XBRL facilitates the integration of business reporting procedures. At
this point, XBRL can provide significant benefits to both small and large firms. Second, this
study suggests that the substitution effects of XBRL and social media are not as strong as I
expected. In H3a and H3b, I predict that the adoption of XBRL and social media sentiment are
more important for new-relationship lending. However, these hypotheses are not supported by
the analyses. This result implies that when lenders have limited access to the private information
of borrowers, they may rely on other traditional tools such as business press or professional
databases to evaluate loan risks. In this case, the adoption of XBRL and social media sentiment
only has a weak influence on new-relationship lending. This finding may also explain the nonresults for the hypotheses concerning the effects of XBRL adoption and social media sentiment
on loan maturities (H5a, H5b) and collateral (H6b).
5.2

RESEARCH LIMITATIONS
This study is limited in several ways. First, this study uses two social media websites to

analyze the influence of social media sentiment on loan contracts. Some popular websites such
as Google Finance and Facebook are not included in the dataset. In addition, the social media
dataset used in the experiments is from the postings of two websites in 2011. This dataset may
not be able to fully reveal the influence of social media on today's financial markets. As more
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stakeholders rely on various social media to express their opinions and findings, future research
should explore more social media websites and employ more current data to improve the quality
of the results.
Second, the models in this study only contain limited control variables. For instance, the
access to public debt markets is suggested to have an influence on loan contracting because this
access increase borrowers' bargaining power with banks(Hasan et al., 2012). Similarly, Accruals
is also found to be associated with bank loan prices. Due to limited data access, these variables
are not included in the models. In the future, I will include more variables in the models and
investigate how these variables affect the relations between XBRL adoption and loan contracting,
and relations between social media user opinions and loan contracting.
Third, prior studies find that the quality of sentiment analysis depends on how the
sentiment analysis algorithms specialize to the particular domain(Hogenboom, Bal, Frasincar, &
Bal, 2013; Nann et al., 2013). This study uses a predefined domain dictionary to determine
financial sentiment in the postings. In the future, more valuable predefined words should be
added to the domain dictionary to increase the accuracy of sentiment analysis. In addition, this
study only applies single sentiment analysis method, which cannot efficiently extract sentiment
from various social media data sources. For instance, the length of posts on Twitter is relatively
short. As short tweets do not provide enough word occurrence, it is unsuitable to apply sentiment
analysis method used in this study to identify and categorize sentiment in tweets. In this case, a
method using the author information and features within the tweets may achieve higher
quality in sentiment recognition(Sriram, Fuhry, Demir, Ferhatosmanoglu, & Demirbas, 2010).
To address this issue, future research should apply a variety of sophisticated sentiment analysis
methods to improve the performance of sentiment analysis.
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5.3

FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are many possibilities exist for future research. First, future work could extend the

research to private firms. Prior studies find that there is less information asymmetry in private
firms than in public firms because major investors can easily access internal information of
private firms(Chen, Hope, Li, & Wang, 2011; Kim & Kwon, 2015). While major investors often
manage private firms directly, lenders in the capital markets may not have the same access as
major investors have. Hence, it is necessary to investigate how XBRL and social media affect the
information asymmetry between private borrowers and lenders.
Second, future research could explore the impact of XBRL and social media on loan
contracts in markets of other countries. Compared to US market, other markets have different
culture and social structures that may result in various levels of information asymmetry. Further
investigation on other markets would help practitioners to have a better understanding of how to
use XBRL and social media to minimize information risk under different circumstances.
Finally, analytic tools used in this study can only extract attitude, and feelings from social
media websites. A lot of useful information including concepts, keywords, relations, and social
structures is excluded. Therefore, future research could apply more analytic approaches such as
content analysis or social network analysis to further explore the effects of social media on
capital markets.
5.4

CONCLUSION
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether two information technology

advancements, the adoption of XBRL (eXtensible Business Reporting Language), and social
media, affect bank loan contracting. Using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts in 2011, I
find that borrowers that adopt XBRL and/or receive more positive social media user opinion
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enjoy more favorable price and non-price terms of bank loan contracts. Additional analyses
indicate that the relations between XBRL adoption and bank loan price, and relations between
social media user opinion and bank loan price vary with the firm size, loan structure, and
availability of public information of borrowers. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence
that technology advancements, the adoption of XRBL and social media, reduce cost of bank
loans by decreasing information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.
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Figure 1 Firm Clustering System

Figure 2 Clustering Firms Based on the Tags Firms Used
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Figure 3 Distribution of Major Industry in 20 Clusters

Figure 4 Framework of Bank Loan Pricing Analytics System
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Figure 5 User Interface of Hive Based Distributed Storage Platform
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Figure 6 Message Board of Microsoft on Yahoo Finance
(Yahoo Finance, 2016)
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Figure 7 Sample Articles and Comments of Microsoft on Seeking Alpha
(Seeking Alpha, 2016b)
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Table 1 Example of XBRL Specification
Name

Definition

Simple link

A link that points from
one resource to another.
It points to Linkbases
from XBRL Instances
and from Taxonomy
Schemas or points to
Taxonomy Schemas
from XBRL Instance

The
"schemaRef"
element in
XBRL
Instances

Every XBRL instance
must contain at least
one "schemaRef"
element. It points to a
Taxonomy Schema that
becomes part of the
DTS supporting that
XBRL instance.

Examples
<complexContent>
<restriction base="anyType">
<attributeGroup ref="xlink:simpleType"/>
<attribute ref="xlink:href" use="required"/>
<attribute ref="xlink:arcrole"
use="optional"/>
<attribute ref="xlink:role" use="optional"/>
<anyAttribute
namespace="http://www.w3.org/XML/1998/na
mespace" processContents="lax"/>
</restriction>
</complexContent>
<element name="schemaRef"
type="xl:simpleType"
substitutionGroup="xl:simple">
<annotation>
<documentation>
Definition of the schemaRef element - used to
link to XBRL taxonomy schemas from XBRL
instances.
</documentation>
</annotation>
</element>

Notes: Retrieved from http://www.xbrl.org/Specification/XBRL-2.1/REC-2003-12-31/XBRL-2.1-REC2003-12-31+corrected-errata-2013-02-20.html#_3.5.1
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Table 2 Example of Taxonomy Schemas
Name

Data Type

Interest
Receivable

monetary

InterestBearing
ForeignDeposit
MoneyMarket

monetary

InterestBearing
DepositLiabilities
string
ByComponent
Abstract

Investment
OwnedValued
ByTrusteesFlag

boolean

Definition
<xs:element id="us-gaap_InterestReceivable"
name="InterestReceivable" nillable="true"
substitutionGroup="xbrli:item"
type="xbrli:monetaryItemType" xbrli:balance="debit"
xbrli:periodType="instant"/>
<xs:element id="usgaap_InterestBearingForeignDepositMoneyMarket"
name="InterestBearingForeignDepositMoneyMarket"
nillable="true" substitutionGroup="xbrli:item"
type="xbrli:monetaryItemType" xbrli:balance="credit"
xbrli:periodType="instant"/>
<xs:element abstract="true" id="usgaap_InterestBearingDepositLiabilitiesByComponentAbs
tract"
name="InterestBearingDepositLiabilitiesByComponentA
bstract" nillable="true" substitutionGroup="xbrli:item"
type="xbrli:stringItemType"
xbrli:periodType="duration"/>
<xs:element id="usgaap_InvestmentOwnedValuedByTrusteesFlag1"
name="InvestmentOwnedValuedByTrusteesFlag1"
nillable="true" substitutionGroup="xbrli:item"
type="xbrli:booleanItemType"
xbrli:periodType="duration"/>

Notes: Retrieved from http://xbrl.fasb.org/us-gaap/2016/elts/us-gaap-2016-01-31.xsd
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Table 3 Example of Taxonomy Linkbases
Element

Linked
Elements

Weight

IncomeTaxesPaid
Refund

IncomeTaxes
PaidRefundC
lassifiedAsIn
vestingActivi
ties

1

IncomeTaxesPaid
Refund

IncomeTaxes
PaidRefundC
lassifiedAsO
peratingActiv
ities

1

Definition
<link:calculationArc xlink:type="arc"
xlink:arcrole="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/arc
role/summation-item"
xlink:from="IncomeTaxesPaidRefund"
xlink:to="IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifie
dAsInvestingActivities"
xlink:title="calculation:
IncomeTaxesPaidRefund to
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsInvest
ingActivities" order="1.0" weight="1.0"/>
<link:calculationArc xlink:type="arc"
xlink:arcrole="http://www.xbrl.org/2003/arc
role/summation-item"
xlink:from="IncomeTaxesPaidRefund"
xlink:to="IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifie
dAsOperatingActivities"
xlink:title="calculation:
IncomeTaxesPaidRefund to
IncomeTaxesPaidRefundClassifiedAsOpera
tingActivities" order="2.0" weight="1.0"/>

Notes: Retrieved from http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/76/76540/xbrl/2013//trito20131231_cal.xml
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Table 4 Example of XBRL Instance Documents
Element

CashFlowsBefore
ChangesWorking
Capital

CashFlowsBefore
ChangesWorking
Capital

Context

Value

Current_
ForPeriod

Definition
<iascfpfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital
numericContext="Current_ForPeriod">
574000
</iascfpfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital>

57400

Prior_
ForPeriod

<iascfpfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital numericContext="Prior_ForPeriod">
442000
</iascfpfs:CashFlowsBeforeChangesWorkingCa
pital>

442000

Notes: Retrieved from http://www.xbrl.org/taxonomy/int/fr/ias/ci/pfs/2002-11-15/SampleCompany2002-11-15.xml

Table 5 Example of Firm-Tag Matrix
Firm1

Firm2

...

Firmn

Tag1

0

1

…

1

Tag2

1

1

…

1

...

…

…

…

…

Tagn

1

0

…

1
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Table 6 Evaluation of the Number of Clusters
Cluster number
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Local density
0.0171
0.0409
0.0309
0.0278
0.0279
0.0301
0.0344
0.0444
0.0495
0.0500
0.0510
0.0491
0.0670
0.0648
0.0666
0.0737
0.0730
0.0754
0.1002
0.0909
0.0983
0.0939
0.0894
0.0911
0.0904
0.0872
0.0901
0.1186
0.1186

Relative density
0.7596
0.6735
0.5052
0.4755
0.4289
0.3806
0.3550
0.3696
0.3587
0.3417
0.3214
0.3052
0.3009
0.2870
0.2907
0.2899
0.2786
0.2586
0.2540
0.2470
0.2325
0.2215
0.2117
0.2097
0.2002
0.1908
0.1889
0.1834
0.1846

Total density
0.0116
0.0237
0.0179
0.0158
0.0150
0.0136
0.0152
0.0208
0.0215
0.0214
0.0209
0.0193
0.0258
0.0245
0.0250
0.0260
0.0251
0.0237
0.0306
0.0293
0.0289
0.0269
0.0255
0.0258
0.0246
0.0228
0.0228
0.0257
0.0263
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Table 7 Firm Distribution among Industry Groups According to NAICS
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Table 8 Frequent Elements in Cluster 1, Cluster 2, Cluster 5, and Cluster 6

Cluster Frequently Used Elements
1

2

5

6

AccumulatedDeferredInvestmentTaxCredit,PublicUtilitiesDisclosureTextBlock,RegulatoryAssetsCurrent
RegulatoryLiabilityCurrent, RegulatoryLiabilities, AdditionalCollateralAggregateFairValue,
RegulatoryAssets , ScheduleOfJointlyOwnedUtilityPlantsTextBlock,
JointlyOwnedUtilityPlantProportionateOwnershipShare,
JointlyOwnedUtilityPlantOwnershipAmountOfPlantAccumulatedDepreciation.
DebtInstrumentUnamortizedDiscountPremiumNet, PublicUtilitiesPolicyTextBlock
PartnersCapital, GeneralPartnersCapitalAccount, LimitedPartnersCapitalAccount,
PartnersCapitalAccountDistributions, LimitedPartnersCapitalAccountUnitsOutstanding
NetIncomeLossAllocatedToLimitedPartners , PartnersCapitalNotesDisclosureTextBlock,
LiabilitiesAndPartnersCapital, NetIncomeLossPerOutstandingLimitedPartnershipUnit
NetIncomeLossAllocatedToGeneralPartners , WeightedAverageLimitedPartnershipUnitsOutstanding
IncreaseDecreaseInUnearnedPremiums, IncreaseDecreaseInPremiumsReceivable,
PrepaidReinsurancePremiums, ReinsurancePayable
IncreaseDecreaseInDeferredPolicyAcquisitionCosts, NetInvestmentIncome
SupplementalScheduleOfReinsurancePremiumsForInsuranceCompaniesTextBlock，
SupplementaryInsuranceInformationForInsuranceCompaniesDisclosureTextBlock，
IncreaseDecreaseInReinsuranceRecoverable , PremiumsReceivableAtCarryingValue
ScheduleOfProductWarrantyLiabilityTableTextBlock , FutureAmortizationExpenseAfterYearFive
ScheduleOfAccruedLiabilitiesTableTextBlock, ScheduleOfDebtTableTextBlock
BusinessAcquisitionsProFormaRevenue, LiabilitiesFairValueDisclosure
BusinessAcquisitionsProFormaNetIncomeLoss,
ShareBasedCompensationArrangementByShareBasedPayme.
ShareBasedCompensationArrangementByShareBasedPayme, StandardProductWarrantyPolicy
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Table 9 Results of Sample Selection
Stages
Number of transactions in the Thompson one
database

# of Firms

# of loans

3835

5905

Exclude private and non-US companies

(3277)

(5149)

Exclude records without available LIBOR price

(55)

(80)

(45)

(88)

(32)

(34)

426

554

Exclude borrowers without submission of 10-k
from 2009 to 2011
Exclude borrowers without posts on Yahoo
message board and Seeking Alpha
Total number of samples
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Table 10 Summary Statistics
Variable

Min

Median

Mean

Max

Std. Dev.

Loan Spread

5

175

199.621

1,150

123.194

XBRL

0

1

0.894

2

0.759

-0.706

0.221

0.217

1.200

0.334

-1.161

-0.002

0.026

1.350

0.307

7.500

9.439

9.458

11.860

0.720

0

0.260

0.280

1.450

0.202

Current Ratio

0.250

1.600

1.915

8.770

1.141

Cash to Debt
Ratio

0

0.221

88.471

42,040.67

1.853

Profitability

-0.260

0.121

0.132

0.682

0.083

Interest
Coverage

-23.281

5.174

31.839

1554.330

123.508

0

0.190

0.289

0.940

0.266

0.790

1.400

1.705

8.090

0.968

-10.600

1.779

1.774

6.274

1.436

Loan Size(M)

5

350

700.323

15,000

1,155

Maturity

3

60.120

53.262

84.720

14.601

Secured

0

0

0.128

1

0.335

Prior Relations

0

1

0.685

1

0.465

Social
Media(Seeking
Alpha)
Social
Media(Yahoo)
Log(Asset)
Leverage

Tangibility
M/B
zscore
Loan Characteristics

Table 11 Pearson Correlation
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Table 11 (Continued)
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Table 12 XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Bank Loan Price
Dependent variable:

XBRL
Social Media
(Yahoo)
Social Media
(Seeking alpha)
XBRL*Social
Media(Seeking
alpha)
Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations
Control For

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-.132***
(-3.242)

-.125*
(-1.806)
-.047
(-.701)

-.185***
(-3.416)
.407***
(3.609)
.030*
(1.670)
-.00001
(-.769)
-1.270***
(-3.460)
.0003
(1.494)
-.104
(-1.193)
-.088***
(-3.301)
-.068***
(-3.869)
.0001***
(-5.220)
-.045
(-1.089)

-.315***
(-7.284)
.556***
(4.464)
.019
(.929)
-.00003***
(-2.725)
-1.654***
(-3.633)
.002***
(3.777)
.046
(.447)
-.120***
(-3.785)
-.055***
(-2.903)
.0001***
(-4.755)
-.061
(-1.313)

-.157**
(-1.894)

.204
(1.224)
-.284**
(-2.337)

-.412***
(-6.997)
.573***
(3.149)
.007
(.213)
-.00001
(-.743)
-1.472**
(-2.570)
.0003*
(1.582)
-.218
(-1.490)
-.139***
(-3.310)
-.051**
(-2.089)
-.0001***
(-3.606)
-.047
(-.638)

-.251***
(-2.794)
.525***
(2.934)
.010
(.335)
-.00001
(-1.275)
-1.470***
(-2.571)
.0003*
(1.553)
-.269*
(-1.867)
-.135***
(-3.280)
-.052**
(-2.180)
.0001***
(-4.211)
-.041
(-.572)
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Table 12 (Continued)

Industry Effect

Y

Y

Y

Y

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

Y

Y

411

321

211

211

0.632

0.618

0.667

0.684

Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 13 Paired Sample Test

Seeking
Alpha Yahoo

Mean

Std.
Deviation

t

df

Sig.

0.260

0.461

8.082

205

.000

Table 14 Examples of Yahoo Postings and Seeking Alpha Postings

Yahoo postings

Seeking Alpha postings

Me 4! Mikey D's is the
best performing stock in
my portfolio.

Thanks for the analysis on MCD, DGI. This is one of my
favorite companies. Wonderful product, excellent recognition,
and who really thinks McDonald's won't be around in 50 years?
100 years? I keep wanting to pick more MCD up on dips, but it
just seems to dip much less than others on my watchlist, so it is
still a very small position for me. I hope to change that on the
next dip.

Dont fight the trend. The
trend is your friend.

As always, first class article. I am long MCD. Bought my first
100 shares back in 1988. I wish I would have kept those, but I
was a "trader" back in the day. There is no telling what my
yield on cost for those shares would be today. (I KNOW there
is, I'm just to lazy to look it up and I don't want to have to kick
the crap out of myself

HOMEMADE
HAMBURGER RISING
NOW!

If you bought MCD, you must know something! Thanks for the
heads up on the dividend increase. I'm sure my granddaughter
will have it by then and maybe I will too

summertime is for beer
not coffee.

I consider MCD to be more of a growth stock than a dividend
stock. It has taken me a long time to compromise my yield on
this stock down to 3%, but I never could get in. The same thing
happened when I started investing in PG many years ago.
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Table 15 Robustness Check- Control for Clusters
Dependent
Variable

XBRL

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-.160***
(-2.871)

-.135*
(-1.795)
.452***
(2.791)
.032
(1.306)
-.0001
(-.156)
-.704
(-1.301)
.0001
(.970)
-.108
(-.980)
-.165***
(-4.201)
-.071***
(-3.656)
-.0001***
(-5.485)
-.093*
(-1.591)

-.359***
(-3.851)
.634***
(2.862)
-.008
(-.209)
.018**
(2.449)
-1.678**
(-2.381)
.001
(.907)
.004
(.022)
-.148***
(-2.994)
-.042*
(-1.629)
-.0001***
(-4.193)
-.009
(-.1)

-.032*
(-1.233)
.022
(.856)
-.162***
(-2.573)
-.229***
(-2.213)
.854***
(1.032)
-.001
(-.01)
.008***
(1.522)
-1.349**
(-1.522)
.0001
(.325)
-.024
(-1.153)
-.102***
(-.1.832)
-.023*
(-1.325)
-.0001***
(-3.514)
-.018
(-.216)

Cluster Effect

Y

Y

Y

Industry Effect

N

N

N

Social Media
XBRL*Social
Media
Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt
Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations

-.231**
(-2.452)

Control For
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Table 15 (Continued)

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose
Effect
Observations

Y

Y

Y

259

163

163

0.567

0.609

0.652

Adjusted RSquared

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 16 Robustness Check- Exclude Financial and Utility Firms
Dependent Variable

XBRL

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.128***
(-3.069)

-.153***
(-2.739)
.381***
(3.359)
.019
(1.030)
-.00001
(-.797)
-1.636***
(-4.350)
-.0003*
(1.828)
-.037
(-.412)
-.067**
(-2.432)
-.078***
(-4.371)
-.0001***
(-6.043)
-.028
(-.661)

-.413***
(-6.662)
.526***
(2.842)
.00001
(.0004)
-.00001
(-.837)
-1.973***
(-3.292)
-.0001*
(1.805)
-.049
(-.302)
-.110**
(-2.501)
-.058**
(-2.365)
-.0001***
(-4.156)
.021
(.281)

-.083*
(-1.203)
.102
(2.230)
-.087**
(-1.321)
-.189***
(-3.822)
.228**
(1.351)
.0002
(.011)
-.00001
(-.765)
-1.601***
(-3.112)
.0002*
(1.236)
.004
(.032)
-.057**
(-1.869)
-.071***
(-3.456)
.0001***
(-4.632)
-.028
(-.393)

Industry Effect

Y

Y

Y

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Y

Social Media

-.087*
(-.955)

XBRL*Social Media
Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations
Control For
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Table 16 (Continued)

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

Y

Observations

370

187

187

Adjusted R-Squared

.657

.698

.715

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 17 Robustness Check- Median Regression
Dependent Variable

XBRL

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-.108***
(-2.696)

Social Media

-.001**
(-2.439)

XBRL*Social Media
Prior Relations
Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size

-.034*
(-.761 )
-.285***
(-6.237)
.001
(.348)
.001*
(1.507)
-.0003
(-1.308)
.0004
(.665)
-.0003*
(-1.412)
-.002*
(-2.031)
-.003***
(-5.204)
-.001***
(-3.827)
-.0004
(-.767)

-.06
(-1.364)
.281***
(5.641)
.002*
(1.487)
.001*
(1.891)
-.0001
(-.317)
.0003
(.568)
-.001**
(-2.503)
-.0004
(-0.373)
-.003***
(-5.321)
-.001***
(-3.537)
-.001***
(-.409)

-.098**
(-1.854)
0.032
(1.223)
-.0004*
(-1.559)
-.053*
(-1.228)
-.283***
(-8.320)
.001
(.235)
.001
(2.002)
-.0001
(-.282)
.0001
(0.352)
-0.0001*
(-.885)
-.001
(-.562)
-0.002***
(-4.385)
-.001***
(-4.215)
-.001*
(-1.125)

Control For
Industry Effect

Y

Y

Y

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Y
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Table 17 (Continued)

Loan-Purpose Effect
Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

Y

Y

Y

259

183

183

0.602

0.592

0.657

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 18 Firm Size, XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Loan Price
Dependent Variable

XBRL
XBRL*Small Firms

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

-.164***
(-3.797)
-.052
(-.806)

Social Media

.170**
(2.350)
.399***
(3.489)
.033**
(1.818)
-.00001
(-.763)
-1.180***
(-3.210)
.0003
(1.465)
-.104
(-1.181)
-.082***
(-3.033)
-.065***
(-3.627)
-.0001***
(-7.595)
-.044
(-1.041)

-.312***
(-2.879)
.370**
(2.165)
.362***
(4.627)
.582***
(3.130)
.010
(.3)
-.00001
(-.567)
-1.785***
(-3.051)
.0003
(1.419)
-.128
(-.853)
-.110***
(-2.602)
-.035
(-1.416)
-.00015***
(-7.680)
-.055
(-.718)

Y

Y

Social Media*Small Firms
Small Firms
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations
Control For
Industry Effect
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Table 18 (Continued)

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

411

211

0.627

0.656

Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 19 New Relationship, XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Loan Price
Dependent Variable

XBRL
XBRL* New Loans

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

-.118***
(-2.737)
-.050
(-.869)

Social Media

.080
(1.386)
-.183***
(-3.379)
.410***
(3.631)
.030*
(1.705)
-.00001
(-.832)
-1.260***
(-3.429)
.0003
(1.479)
-.105
(-1.205)
-.089***
(-3.319)
-.069***
(-3.907)
-.0001***
(-5.284)

-.243***
(-2.400)
.270
(1.464)
-.011
(-.127)
-.411***
(-6.997)
.552***
(3.036)
.008
(.268)
-.00001
(-.886)
-1.644***
(-2.821)
.0003
(1.495)
-.213
(-1.455)
-.133***
(-3.139)
-.052**
(-2.122)
-.0001***
(-3.605)

Y

Y

Social Media* New Loans
New Loans
Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Control For
Industry Effect
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Table 19 (Continued)

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

411

211

0.632

0.669

Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 20 Syndication, XBRL Adoption, Social Media Sentiment, and Bank Loan Price
Dependent Variable

XBRL
XBRL*Syndication

Log(spread)

Log(spread)

(1)

(2)

-.577***
(-3.219)
.444**
(2.529)

Social Media
Social Media* Syndication
Syndication
Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations
Control For

.532***
(2.865)
-.164***
(-3.029)
.427***
(3.772)
.033**
(1.843)
-.00001
(-.745)
-1.172***
(-3.199)
.0003
(1.522)
-.102
(-1.180)
-.089***
(-3.355)
-.067***
(-3.841)
-.0001***
(-5.548)
-.037
(-.877)

-1.178**
(-1.978)
1.040*
(1.737)
.185
(1.043)
-.388***
(-6.446)
.643***
(3.341)
.010
(.325)
-.00001
(-.706)
-1.336**
(-2.316)
.0004*
(1.640)
-.219
(-1.498)
-.141***
(-3.354)
-.049**
(-2.029)
-.0001***
(-3.785)
-.048
(-.638)
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Table 20 (Continued)

Industry Effect

Y

Y

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

411

211

0.638

0.670

Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 21 Loan Maturities, XBRL Adoption and Social Media Sentiment
Dependent Variable

XBRL

Log(Maturity)

Log(Maturity)

(1)

(2)

-.007
(-.161)

Social Media
.074
(1.336)
.077
(.668)
.037**
(2.048)
.000004
(.547)
.001
(002)
-.0001
(-.602)
.063
(.710)
.013
(.475)
.049***
(2.739)
.00001
(.409)
-.037
(-.872)

-.029
(-.362)
.011
(.186)
.162
(.910)
.053*
(1.725)
.000002
(.276)
.304
(.543)
-.0001
(-.474)
.001
(.009)
-.027
(-.654)
.025
(1.051)
.00002
(.896)
-.030
(-.417)

Industry Effect

Y

Y

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations
Control For
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Table 21 (Continued)

Observations
Adjusted R-Squared

411

211

0.348

0.449

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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Table 22 Collateral, XBRL Adoption, and Social Media Sentiment
Dependent Variable

XBRL

Secured

Secured

(1)

(2)

-.062*
(-1.635)

Social Media
-.075
(-1.484)
.261**
(2.462)
.030*
(1.775)
-.00001*
(-1.719)
-1.410***
(-4.092)
.001***
(2.693)
.008
(.104)
.036
(1.415)
.033**
(2.015)
.00002
(1.198)
-.084**
(-2.146)

-.079
(-1.275)
-.131***
(-2.976)
.176
(1.298)
-.009
(-.372)
-.00001
(-1.433)
-.753*
(-1.765)
.001***
(2.995)
-.107
(-.975)
-.010
(-.306)
.025
(1.382)
.00002
(1.323)
-.129**
(-2.348)

Industry Effect

Y

Y

Loan-Type effect

Y

Y

Loan-Purpose Effect

Y

Y

411

211

Log(asset)
Leverage
Current Ratio
Cash to Debt Ratio
Profitability
Interest Coverage
Tangibility
MB
zscore
Loan Size
Prior Relations
Control For

Observations
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Table 22 (Continued)

Adjusted R-Squared

0.128

0.136

Notes: Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ respectively.
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX A: DEFINITION OF STUDY VARIABLES

Variables
Log(spread)
XBRL
Social Media

Definitions
The natural logarithm of spread, where spread is the initial interest rate
spread over London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)
Times of borrowers included XBRL in its financial reporting from
2009 to 2011
Sum of financial terms sentiment and general sentiment, where
Financial terms sentiment is the finance-related sentiment score of
postings, general sentiment is the general sentiment score of postings.

Log(Asset)

The natural logarithm of the total assets of borrowers

Leverage

Total debts including long-term debt and short term debt divided by
firm book assets

Current Ratio

Current assets divided by current liability

Cash to Debt Ratio

Total cash divided by total debt

Profitability

Net income over total sales

Interest Coverage

EBIT divided by total interest expense

Tangibility

Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets

MB

Market to book ratio

Loan Size

Total amount of bank loan

Prior Relations
zscore
Maturity
Secured
New Loans
Syndication

Dummy variable which is equal to one when there is a previous lending
relationship between lenders and borrowers, it equals zero otherwise
(1.2*Working capital+1.48Retained earnings + 3.3*EBIT +
0.999*Sales)/Total assets
Loan maturity
Dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s assets are less than the
sample median of total assets, and zero otherwise
Dummy variable, which equals one if when there is no a previous
lending relationship between lenders and borrowers, and zero
otherwise
Dummy variable, which equals one if a loan is offered by more than
one lender, and zero otherwise
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APPENDIX A (CONTINUED)
Variables

Definitions

Small Firms

Dummy variable, which equals one if a firm’s assets are less than the
sample median of total assets, and zero otherwise
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